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Dipersembahkan kepada:
Seluruh Korban Rejim Jendral Suharto

English Version
Dedicated to:
all the Victims of General Suharto´s Regime

L A M P I R A N – A T T A C H M E N T S

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D.N. Aidit Menggugat Peristiwa Madiun

Tulisan ini adalah pidato Kawan D.N. Aidit didalam Sidang DPR tanggal 11 Februari 1957 mendjawab keterangan anggota DPR Udin Sjamsudin (Masjumi) jang mentjoba menutupi maksud2 kontra-revolusioner dari "dewan2 partikelir" di Sumatera dengan menjinggung2 soal Peristiwa Madiun.

Dengan pidato Kawan D.N. Aidit ini masjarakat dapat mengetahui dengan lebih djelas lagi hakekat Peristiwa Madiun, suatu provokasi reaksi jang dilantjarkan oleh Hatta dan arti pemberontakan kontra-revolusioner gerombolan Siinbolon dan Ahmad Husein jang satu tahun kemudian mentjapai puntjaknja dengan diproklamasikannja "Pemerintah Revolusioner Republik Indonesia" di Padang oleh gembong2 Masjumi-PSI seperti Sjafruddin Prawiranegara dan Sumitro Djojohadikusumo.

Dengan tulisan ini Rakjat Indonesia sampai sekarang mempunjai tiga dokumen penting tentang Peristiwa Madiun jaitu : B u k u P u t i h t e n t a n g P e r i s t i w a M a d i u n jang diterbitkan oleh Departemen Agitprop CC PKI, M e n g g u g a t P e r i s t i w a M a d i u n dan K o n f r o n t a s i P e r i s t i w a M a d i u n 1 9 4 8 -- P e r i s t i w a S u m a t e r a ( 1 9 5 6 )

Komisi Pilihan Tulisan

D.N. Aidit dari CC PKI.

Terlebih dulu saja ingin menjatakan bahwa Pemerintah Ali-ldham dalam keterangannja pada tanggal 21 Djanuari dan dalam djawabannja pada pandangan umum babak pertama pada tanggal 4 Februari jl. bisa membatasi diri pada persoalannja, jaitu tentang kedjadian2 di Sumatera dalam bulan Desember 1956. Hal ini dapat saja hargai dan tentang ini kawan2 sefraksi saja sudah menjatakan pendapat Fraksi PKI.

Pada pokoknja pendapat kami mengenai kedjadian2 di Sumatera dalam bulan Desember tahun jl. Adalah sbb. :

Pertama : Kedjadian2 di Sumatera Utara, Sumatera Tengah dan Sumatera Selatan adalah rentetan kedjadian jang sengadja ditimbulkan oleh sebuah partai ketjil jang kalah dalam pemilihan umum jl. jang berhasil mendalangi sebuah partai besar dan oknum2 liar, jang tidak melihat kemungkinan dengan djalan demokratis dapat duduk kembali dalam kekuasaan sentral, dan jang hanja melihat kemungkinan dengan djalan menggunakan saluran partai2 lain, dengan djalan mempertadjam perten-tangan antara partai2 agama dengan PKI dan PNI, dengan bikin2an menimbulkan kemarahan Rakjat didaerah2 supaja memberontak terhadap Pemerintah Pusat, dengan djalan mengadudomba suku satu dengan suku lainnja dan dengan djalan menghasut orang2 militer supaja memberontak kepada atasannja.

Kedua : Kedjadian2 tersebut terang sedjalan dan berhubungan dengan rentjana kaum imperialis, jang dipelopori oleh Amerika Serikat untuk menarik Indonesia kedalam pakt militer SEATO. Rentjana2 dari pemberontak di Sumatera untuk memisahkan Sumatera dan Kalimantan dari Pemerintah Pusat dan untuk mendirikan negara sendiri jang mempunjai peralatan sipil dan militer sendiri, jang mempunjai hubungan luarnegeri sendiri, adalah sepenuhnja sedjalan dengan rentjana Amerika Serikat jang diatur oleh Pentagon (Kementerian Pertahanan) dan State Department (Kementerian Luarnegeri) Amerika Serikat, oleh "djendral2" DI-TII dan oleh aparat2 serta kakitangan2 Amerika Serikat jang ada di Indonesia.

Djadi, persoalannja adalah djelas, jaitu. kepentingan vital Rakjat Indonesia disatu fihak berhadapan langsung dengan kepentingan kaum imperialis asing difihak lain. Dalam hal ini Pemerintah Ali-Idham menjatukan diri dengan kepentingan Rakjat Indonesia, dan oleh karena itu PKI tidak ragu2 berdiri difihak Pemerintah dan melawan kaum pemberontak serta aktor2 intelektualisnja. Demikianlah, kalau mengenai persoalannja. Djelas dimana kami berdiri, dan djelas pula dimana fihak lain berdiri. Tetapi, disamping pemerintah dapat membatasi diri pada persoalan jang sedang dihadapi, anggota jang terhormat Udin Sjamsudin telah mem-bawa2 Peristiwa Madiun, dengan maksud mengaburkan persoalan.

Dalam Soal Peristiwa Madiun Kaum Komunis Adalah Pendakwa Anggota tsb. telah me-njebut2 Peristiwa Madiun dalam hubungan dengan Peristiwa Sumatera, antara lain dikatakannja "pelopor pemberontakan di Indonesia ini setelah Indonesia Merdeka adalah Partai Koniunis Indonesia", selandjutnja "kaum Komunislah jang mendjadi mahaguru pemberontakan" dan "bibitnja sudah menular keseluruh Indone-sia". Maksud pembitjara tsb. djelas, jaitu supaja dalam soal peniberontakan Kolonel Simbolon dan Letnan Kolonel Ahmad Husein djuga PKI jang disalahkan. Lihatlah, betapa tidak tahu malunja orang mentjari kambinghitamnja, sama dengan tidak tahu malunja mereka menjalahkan PKI dalam hubungan dengan Peristiwa Madiun. Saja tidak membantah, bahwa baik Peristiwa Madiun maupun Peristiwa Sumatera mem-punjai satu sumber dan satu tudjuan, jaitu bersumber pada imperialisme Amerika dan Belanda dan bertudjuan untuk meletakkan Indonesia sepenuhnja dibawah telapak kaki mereka.

Berhubung dengan sebuah statement Politbiro CC PKI tanggal 13 September 1953 saja pernah dihadapkan kemuka pengadilan. Dalam sidang pengadilan tanggal 27 Djanuari 1955, dengan berpegang pada ajat 3 fasal 310 KUHP jang ditimpakan pada saja, sudah saja njatakan kesediaan saja kepada pengadilan untuk membuktikan dengan saksi2 bahwa Peristiwa Madiun memang provokasi dan bahwa dalam Peristiwa Madiun tsb. tangan Hatta-Sukiman-Natsir cs. memang berlumuran darah. Dengan ini berarti bahwa Hatta, ketika itu masih wakil Presiden, harus tampil sebagai saksi berhadapan dengan saja. Kesediaan saja ini, jang djuga diperkuat oleh advokat saja, Sdr. Mr. Suprapto, tidak mendapat persetudjuan. pengadilan. Djaksa menjatakan keberatannja akan pembuktian jang mau saja adjukan dengan saksi2. Oleh karena djaksa menolak pembuktian jang mau saja adjukan, maka djaksa terpaksa mentjabut tuduhan melanggar fasal 310 dan 311 KUHP. Djelaslah, bahwa ada orang2 jang kuatir kalau Peristiwa Madiun ini mendjadi terang bagi Rakjat.

Djadi, mengenai Peristiwa Madiun kami sudah lama siap berhadapan dimuka pengadilan dengan arsiteknja Moh. Hatta. Ini saja njatakan tidak hanja sesudah Hatta berhenti sebagai wakil Presiden, tetapi seperti diatas sudah saja katakan, djuga ketika Hatta masih Wakil Presiden. Saja tidak ingin menantang siapa-siapa, tetapi kapan sadja Hatta ingin Peristiwa Madiun dibawa kepengadilan, kami dari PKI selarnanja bersedia menghadapinja. Kami jakin, bahwa djika soal ini dibawa kepe-ngadilan bukanlah kami jang akan mendjadi terdakwa, tetapi kamilah pendakwa. Kamilah jang akan tampil kedepan sebagai pendakwa atasnama Amir Sjarifuddin, putera utama bangsa Indonesia jang berasal dari tanah Batak, atasnama Suripno, Maruto Darusman, Dr. Wiroreno, Dr. Rustam, Harjono, Djokosujono, Sukarno, Sutrisno, Sardjono dan beribu-ribu lagi putera Indonesia jang terbaik dari suku Djawa jang mendjadi korban keganasan satu pemerintah jang dipimpin oleh burdjuis Minangkabau, Mohammad Hatta. Demikian kalau kita mau berbitjara dalam istilah kesukuan, sebagaimana sekarang banjak digunakan oleh pembela2 kaum pem-berontak di Sumatera, hal jang sedapat mungkin ingin kami hindari. Ja, kami djuga akan berbitjara atasnama perwira2, bintara2 dan pradjurit2 TNI jang tewas dalam "membasmi Komunis" atas perintah Hatta, karena mereka djuga tidak bersalah dan mereka djuga adalah korban perang-saudara jang dikobarkan oleh Hatta.

Dalam pembelaan saja dimuka pengadilan tanggal 24 Februari 1955 telah saja katakan "bahwa diantara orang2 jang karena tidak mengertinja telah ikut dalam pengedjaran 'terhadap kaum Komunis', tidak sedikit sekarang sudah tidak mempunjai purbasangka lagi terhadap PKI dan sudah berdjandji pada diri sendiri untuk tidak lagi mendjadi alat perang-saudara dari kaum imperialis dan kakitangannja". Alat2 negara sipil maupun militer sudah mengerti bahwa dalam Peristiwa Madiun mereka telah disuruh memerangi saudara2 dan teman2nja sendiri.

Sudah mendjadi rahasia umum, bahwa dalam pemiiihan umum untuk Parlemen maupun untuk Konstituante lebih 80% daripada anggota2 Angkatan Perang memberikan suaranja kepada partai2 demokratis, dan 30% daripada suara jang diberikan anggota Angkatan Perang adalah diberikan kepada PKI. PSI dan Masjumi hanja mendapat kurang dari 20%, djadi kurang dari suara jang didapat oleh PKI sendiri atau PNI sendiri. PSI jang mempunjai pengaruh disedjumlah opsir tinggi adalah partai kelima didalam Angkatan Perang, sedangkan Masjumi, karena politik pro Dl-nja, adalah partai keenam. Dengan ini, saja hanja hendak memibuktikan bahwa memukul PKI dengan menjembar-njemburkan Peristiwa Madiun adalah tidak merugikan PKI, malahan memberi alasan pada kami untuk berbitjara dan mendjelas-djelaskan tentang Peristiwa Madiun.

Apalagi sekarang, sesudah terdjadi pemberontakan kolonel Simbolon di Sumatera Utara dan pemberontakan "Dewan Banteng" di Sumatera Barat, menggunakan Peristiwa Madiun untuk memukul PKI adalah seperti menepuk air didulang, bukan muka PKI jang kena, tetapi muka Masjumi dan PSI sendiri jang sekarang membela pemberontak2 di Sumatera itu dengan mati2an.

Hatta Bertanggungdjawab Atas Pentjulikan, Pembunuhan Dan Perang-Saudara Tahun 1948

Mari, dalam menilai kebidjaksanaan pemerintah Ali-Idham sekarang, kita perban-dingkan antara kebidjaksanaan pemerintah Hatta tahun 1948 mengenai Peristiwa Madiun dengan kebidjaksanaan pemerintah Ali-ldham sekarang. Dari hasil penilaian ini saja akan rnenentukan sikap saia terhadap kebidjaksanaan pemerintah sekarang. Peristiwa Madiun didahului oleh kedjadian2 di Solo, mula2 dengan pembunuhan atas diri kolonel Sutarto, Komandan TNI Divisi IV, dan kemudian pada permulaan September 1948 dengan pentjulikan dan pembunuhan terhadap 5 orang perwira TNI, jaitu major Esmara Sugeng, kapten Sutarto, kapten Sapardi, kapten Suradi dan letnan Muljono. Djuga ditjulik 2 orang anggota PKI, Slamet Widja,ja dan Pardijo. Kenjataan bahwa saudara jang ditjulik ini pada tgl 24 September dimasukkan kedalam kamp resmi di Danuredjan, Djokdjakarta, membuktikan bahwa pemerntah Hatta langsung tjampurtangan dalam soal pentjulikan2 dan pembunuhan2 diatas. Ini tidak bisa diragukan lagi !

Dalam pidatonja tgl. 19 September 1948 Presiden Sukarno mengatakan bahwa Peristiwa Solo dan Peristiwa Madiun tidak berdiri sendiri. Ini sepenuhnja benar ! Sesudah pentjulikan2 dan pembunuhan2 di Solo jang diatur dari Djokja, keadaan di Madiun mendjadi sangat tegang sehingga terdjadilah pertempuran antara pasukan2 dalam Angkatan Darat jang pro dan jang anti pentjulikan2 serta pembunuhan2 di Solo, jaitu pertempuran pada tgl. 18 September 1948 malam. Dalam keadaan katjaubalau demikian ini Residen Kepala Daerah tidak ada di Madiun, Wakil Residen tidak mengambil tindakan apa2 sedangkan Walikota sedang sakit. Untuk mengatasi keadaan ini maka Front Demokrasi Rakjat, dimana PKI termasuk didalamnja, mendesak supaja Kawan Supardi, Wakil Walikota Madiun bertindak untuk sementara sebagai pendjabat Residen selama Residen Madiun belum kembali. Wakil Walikota Supardi berani mengambil tanggungdjawab ini. Pongangkatan Kawan Supardi sebagai Residen sementara ternjata djuga disetudjui oleh pembesar2 militer dan pembesar2 Sipil lainnja. Tindakan ini segera dilaporkan kepemerintah pusat dan dimintakan instruksi dari pemerintah pusat tentang apa jang harus dikerdjakan selandjutnja.

Nah, tindakan inilah, tindakan mengangkat Wakil Walikota mendjadi Residen sementara inilah jang dinamakan oleh pemerintah Hatta tindakan "merobohkan pemerintah Republik Indonesia", tindakan "mengadakan kudeta" dan tindakan "mendirikan pemerintah Sovjet". Kalau dengan mengangkat seorang Wakil Walikota mendjadi Residen sementara bisa dinamakan merobohkan pemerintah Republik Indonesia, bisa dinamakan kudeta dan bisa dinamakan mendirikan pemerintah Sovjet, nama apakah lagi jang bisa diberikan kepada tindakan komplotan Simbolon dan "Dewan Banteng" di Sumatera? Selain daripada itu, djika memang demikian halnja, alangkah mudahnja merobohkan pemerintah Republik Indonesia, alangkah mudahnja mengadakan kudeta dan alangkah mudahnja mendirikan pemerintah Sovjet ! Djika memang demikian mudahnja, saja kira sekarang sudah tidak ada lagi Republik kita, karena nafsu merobohkan Republik sekarang, begitu di-kobar2kan dan begitu besarnja disementara golongan, terutama dikalangan sebuah partai ketjil jang kalah dalam pemilihan umum jang lalu. Tetapi saja kira, merobohkan Republik Indonesia tidaklah begitu mudah sebagaimana sudah dibuktikan oleh kegagalan Simbolon dan oleh makin merosotnja pamor "Dewan Banteng", disamping Republik Indonesia tetap berdiri tegak. Apalagi mendirikan pemerintah Sovjet, tidaklah semudah mengangkat seorang Wakil Walikota mendjadi Residen sementara. Rakjat Tiongkok dan Tentara Pembebasan Rakiat Tiongkok jang sudah berdjuang mati2an selama ber-puluh2 tahun dibawah pimpinan Partai Komunis Tiongkok hingga sekarang belum sampai ketaraf mendirikan pemerintah Sovjet, artinja pemerintah sosialis di Tiongkok. Djadi, alangkah bebalnja, atau alangkah mentjari2nja orang2 jang menuduh PKI merobohkan Republik dan mendirikan pemerintah Sovjet di Madiun dengan mengangkat Wakil Walikota Supardi mendjadi Residen sementara.

Berdasarkan kedjadian pengangkatan Wakil Walikota Supardi mendjadi Residen sementara dan atas tanggungdjawab sepenuhnja dari pemerintah Hatta, maka pada tanggal 19 September 1948 oleh Presiden Sukarno dadakan pidato jang berisi seruan kepada seluruh Rakjat ber-sama2 membasmi "kaum pengatjau",maksudnja membasmi kaum Komunis dan kaum progresif lainnja setjara djasmaniah. Saja katakan sepenuhnja tanggungdjawab pemerintah Hatta, karena Hattalah jang mendjadi Perdana Menteri ketika itu. Tapi karena Hatta tahu bahwa pengaruhnja sangat ketjil dikalangan Angkatan Perang dan alat2 negara lainnja, apalagi dikalangan masjarakat, maka Hatta menggunakan mulut Sukarno dan rnemindjam kewibawaan Sukarno untuk membasmi Amir Sjarifuddin dan be-ribu2 putera Indonesia asal suku Djawa. Ini, sekali lagi, kalau kita rnau berbitjara dalam istilah kesukuan jang sekarang banjak dilakukan oleh pembela2 kaum pemberontak di Sumatera, sesuatu jang sedapat niungkin ingin kami hindari.

Demikianlah, "kebidjaksanaan" Hatta sebagai Perdana Menteri dalam menghadapi persoalan-persoalan masjarakat dan persoalan politik jang kongkrit. Karena kepitjikannja dari kesornbongannja sebagai burdjuis Minang jang ingin melondjak tjepat sampai keangkasa, karena kehausannja akan kekuasaan, karena kepalabatunja, karena ketakutannja jang keterlaluan kepada Komunisme, maka Hatta sebagai Perdana Menteri dengan setjara gegabah mengerahkan alat2 kekuasaan negara untuk mentjulik, membunuh dan mengobarkan perangsaudara. Orang sering salah kira dengan menjamakan sifat kepalabatu Hatta dengan "kemauan keras" atau sikap jang "konsekwen". Tetapi saja jang djuga mengenal Hatta dari dekat berpendapat, bahwa sifat kepalabatu Hatta adalah disebabkan karena sempit pikirannja, dan karena sempit pikirannja ia tidak bisa bertukar fikiran setjara sehat, tidak pandai bermusjawarah dan tahunja hanja main "ngotot", "mutung", "basmi" dan "tangan besi". Dan apa akibatnja permainan "basmi" dan "tangan besi" Hatta ? Be-ribu2 pemuda dan Rakjat dari kedua belah fihak jang berperang mati karenanja. Seluruh Rakjat sudah mengetahui dari pengalamannja sendiri bahwa semua ini dilakukan hanja untuk melapangkan djalan bagi Hatta buat pelaksanaan Konferensi Medja Bundar dengan Belanda jang langsung diawasi oleh Amerika Serikat, untuk membikin perdjandjian KMB jang chianat dan jang sudah kita batalkan itu.

Sifat gegabah dari tindakan Hatta lebih nampak lagi ketika ia meminta kekuasaan penuh dari BPKNIP, dimana didalam pidatonja dinjatakan bahwa "Tersiar pula berita -- entah benar entah tidak -- bahwa Musso akan mendjadi Presiden Republik rampasan itu dan Mr. Amir Sjarifuddin Perdana Menteri". Lihatlah betapa tidak bertanggungdjawabnja tindakan Hatta. la bertindak atas dasar berita jang sifatnja "entah benar entah tidak" bahwa sesuatu "akan" terdjadi. Ja, Hatta bertindak atas berita jang masih diragukan tentang akan terdjadinja sesuatu. Tetapi, adalah tidak diragukan lagi bahwa tindakan Hatta sudah berakibat dibunuhnja ribuan orang jang tidak berdosa tanpa proses.

Hatta lngin Berkuasa Sewenang-wenang Lagi

Berdasarkan pengalaman dengan Peristiwa Madiun, dimana Hatta menelandjangi dirinja sebagai manusia jang tidak berperikemanusiaan, maka saja seudjung rambutpun tidak ragu bahwa Hatta, seperti belum lama berselang dimuat dalam koran2 pemah mengutjapkan kepada Firdaus A. N., hanja bersedia berkuasa djika tidak bisa didjatuhan oleh Parlemen. Kalau mau tahu tentang Hatta, inilah dia ! lnilah politiknja, inilah moralnja, inilah segala-galanja! Jaitu, seorang jang mau berkuasa setjara se-wenang2.

Hatta samasekali tidak menghargai djerihpajah Rakjat jang kepanasan dan kehudjanan antri untuk memberikan suaranja untuk Parlemen kita sekarang. Lebih daripada itu, ia djuga tidak menghargai suaranja sendiri jang diberikannja ketika memilih Parlemen ini. Orang jang tidak menghargai orang lain sering kita temukan didunia ini. Tetapi orang jang tidak menghargai suaranja sendiri, ini keterlaluan.

Hatta ingin berkuasa kembali tanpa bisa didjatuhkan oleh Parlemen, ia mengimpikan masa keemasannja ditahun 1948. Kali ini jang mau didjadikannja mangsa bukan hanja putera2 Indonesia asal suku Djawa dan Batak, tetapi djuga putera2 suku lain, termasuk putera2 suku Minangkabau, karena PKI sekarang sudah tersebar diseluruh Indonesia dan disemua suku. Tetapi, sebelum Hatta sampai kesitu, perlu saja peringatkan bahwa dalam tahun 1948 ia hanja berhadapan dengan 10.000 Komunis jang hanja tersebar setjara sangat tidak merata dipulau Djawa dan Sumatera, karena PKI ketika itu dilarang berdiri didaerah pendudukan Belanda. Tetapi sekarang, Hatta harus berhadapan dengan lebih satu djuta Komunis jang tersebar disemua pulau dan disemua suku. Saja perlu menjatakan ini, hanja untuk menerangkan betapa besar akibatnja kalau Hatta bermain "tangan besi" lagi. Dan .... besipun bisa patah !

Saja jakin, bahwa tiap2 orang jang mempunjai peran tanggungdjawab tidak ingin terulang kembali tragedi nasional seperti Peristiwa Madiun itu. Dari fihak Partai Komunis Indonesia, seperti sudah berulang-ulang kami njatakan, dan sudah mendjadi peladjaran didalam Sekolah2 Kursus2 Partai kami, kami ingin dan kami jakin bisa mentjapai tudjuan2 politik kami setjara parlementer. Kami akan menghindari tiap2 perang-saudara selama kepada kami didjamin hak2 politik untuk memperdjuangkan tjita2 kami. Tetapi, kalau kepada kami disodorkan bajonet dan didesingkan peluru seperti dalam peristiwa Madiun, djuga seperti selama peristiwa itu, kami tidak akan memberikan dada kami untuk ditembus bajonet dan ditembus peluru kaum kontra-revolusioner.

Kami kaum Komunis tidak ingin menggangu siapa2 selama kami tidak diganggu. Kami ingin bersahabat dengan semua orang, semua golongan dan semua partai jang mau bersahabat dan bekerdiasama dengan kami untuk haridepan jang lebih baik bagi tanahair dan Rakjat Indonesia. Walaupun dihadapan kantor pusat Masjumi di Kramat Raja 45, Djakarta, terpantjang dengan djelas papan "Front Anti-Komunis", djadi anti kami, anti saja dan anti kawan2 saja, tetapi kami kaum Komunis tidak akan ikut gila untuk djuga memantjangkan papan "Front Anti-Masjumi"', apalagi "Front Anti-lslam". Kami tidak akan membiarkan diri kami terprovokasi oleh pemimpin Masjumi ini. Saja pribadi tidak mau diprovokasi oleh kenalan lama saja, Sdr. Mohamad Isa Anshari, pemimpin akbar "Front Anti-Komunis". Ber-angsur2 Rakjat Indonesia berdasarkan pengalamannja sendiri mendjadi makin jakin bahwa bukanlah kaum Komunis jang anti-agama, tetapi sebaliknja, sedjumlah pemimpin partai2 agamalah jang anti-Komunis dan menghasut anggota2nja supaja anti-Komunis.

Rakjat Indonesa sudah mengetahui bahwa dalam soal pemerintahan kami menginginkan terbentuknja pemerintah persatuan nasional dimana didalamnja duduk 4-Besar, djadi termasuk PKI dan Masjumi, ber-sama2 dengan partai2 lain. Ini akan kami perdjuangkan terus walaupun sampai ini hari saja kira Masjumi belum mau, karena masih mengikuti apa jang dikatakan oleh pemimpin Masjumi Sdr. Moh. Natsir dalam muktamar Masjumi di Bandung bulan Desember 1956. Dalam muktamar tsb. Sdr. Moh. Natsir mengatakan antara lain bahwa pimpinan partai Masjumi "meletakkan strateginja menghadapi pembentukan kabinet kepada dua pokok pikiran jaitu (a) Memulihkan kerdjasama antara partai2 Islam (b) Menggabungkan tenaga2 non-Komunis dalam kabinet, Parlemen dan masjarakat serta mengisolir PKI atau para crypto-Koi-ntinis dari kabinet". (Halaman 22 "Laporan Beleid Politik Pimpinan Partai Masjumi"). Tjobalah renungkan, bukan persatuan nasional jang mereka adjarkan dan amalkan, tetapi perpetjahan nasional. Mengisolasi PKI adalah identik dengan mengisolasi berdjuta-djuta Rakjat Indonesia. Bagaimana persatuan nasional akan bisa tertjapai dengan sikap jang a-priori sematjam ini. Sikap sematjam ini hanja mempertegas keadaan politik dinegeri kita, dan jang untung bukan bangsa Indonesia, tetapi kaum imperialis asing, jang memang menginginkan peruntjingan keadaan dan perpetjahan didalam tubuh bangsa kita.

Djadi, kapankah semua pemuka bangsa kita akan beladjar dari pengalaman Peristiwa Madiun jang tragis itu, supaja tidak lagi mengulangi kesalahan tindakan dan kebidjaksanaan agar persatuan bangsa kita terpelihara baik, supaja kita tidak gegabah dalam mengambil tindakan2, apalagi tindakan2 jang bisa berakibat luas ? Saja berusaha dan terus akan berusaha untuk menarik peladjaran sebanjak-banjaknja dari pengalaman sedjarah itu.

Kabinet Ali-ldham Ber-puluh2 Kali Lebih Bidjaksana Daripada Kabinet Hatta

Dibanding dengan kebidjaksanaan pemerintah Hatta dalam menghadapi kedjadian di Madiun dalam bulan September 1948, kabinet Ali-ldham sekarang ber-puluh2 kali lebih bidjaksana. Padahal kalau melihat kedjadiannja, pengangkatan seorang Wakil Walikota mendjadi Residen sementara karena dipaksa oleh keadaan, belumlah apa2 kalau dibanding dengan pengoperan pimpinan pemerintah daerah Sumatera Tengah oleh orang2 "Dewan Banteng", jang terang-terangan direntjanakan terlebih dulu dalam reunie ex-divisi Banteng bulan

November 1956, dan jang terang2an sudah pernah menolak dan menghina perutusan pemerintah pusat jang datang untuk berunding. Apalagi kalau dibanding dengan perbuatan komplotan kolonel Simbolon pada tanggal 22 Desember 1956, jang terang2an menjatakan tidak lagi mengakui pemerintah jang sah sekarang. Apalagi, kalau kita ingat bahwa maksud jang sesungguhnja dari semua tindakan itu jalah untuk memisahkan Sumatera dan Kalimantan dari Pemerintah Pusat, mendiri-kan negara Sumatera dan Kalimantan serta mengadakan hubungan luarnegeri sendiri. Apalagi kalau diingat bahwa ada maksud2 untuk menjerahkan pulau We di Utara Sumatera kepada negara besar tertentu untuk didjadikan pangkalan-perang. Apalagi kalau diigat bahwa semua rentjana itu sesuai sepenuhnja dengan apa jang direntjanakan oleh Pentagon dan State Department Amerika Serikat, oleh "djendral2" DI-Tll dan aparat2 serta kakitangan2 Amerika lainnja jang ada di Indonesia. Djika diingat semuanja ini, maka pengangkatan Wakil Walikota Supardi mendjadi Residen sementara Madiun adalah hanja "kinderspel" (permainan kanak2).

Tetapi penamaan apa jang diberikan oleh Hatta kepada kedjadian2 di Madiun bulan September 1948 dan penamaan apa pula jang, diberikan orang kepada perbuatan-perbuatan kaum pemberontak di Sumatera pada bulan Desember 1956 ? Peristiwa Madiun dinamakan "merobohkan Republik Indonesia", dinamakan "kudeta", tetapi pemberontakan di Sumatera jang sepenuhnja dan setjara terang2an disokong oleh kaum imperialis asing, terutama kaum imperialis Amerika dan Belanda, mereka namakan "tindakan konstruktif" demi "kepentingan daerah"... Saja bertanja: Kons-truktif untuk siapa ? Untuk kepentingan daerah mana ? Memang konstruktif sekali tindakan kaum pemberontak di Sumatera, konstruktif dalam rangka membangun pangkalan-pangkalan perang SEATO ! Memang untuk kepentingan daerah, kepenti-ngan perluasan daerah SEATO ! Djadi, samasekali tidak konstruktif untuk Rakjat Indonesia dan samasekali bukan untuk kepentingan daerah Indonesia !

Demikianlah, apa sebabnja saja katakan bahwa mengemukakan Peristiwa Madiun dalam keadaan sekarang untuk memukul PKI adalah seperti menepuk air didulang. Bukannja PKI jang ketjipratan, tetapi djustru si-penepuk air jang sial itu. Mengemukakan soal Peristiwa Madiun dalam menghadapi Peristiwa Sumatera sekarang berarti memberi alasan jang kuat untuk mengkonfrontasikan kebidjak-sanaan jang memang bidjaksana dari kabinet Ali-ldham sekarang dengan kebidjak-sanaan jang tidak bidjaksana dari Kabinet Hatta dalam tahun 1948. Djika sudah dikonfrontasikan, maka akan merasa berdosalah orang2 jang ber-teriak2 ingin melihat naiknja Hatta kembali, ketjuali kalau orang2 itu memang ingin melihat Hatta sekali lagi mempermainkan njawa umat Indonesia sebagai mempermainkan njawa anak ajam.

Kebidjaksanaan kabinet Ali-ldham dalam menghadapi Peristiwa Sumatera sekarang tidak disebabkan terutama karena Ali Sastroamidjojo seorang Indonesia dari suku Djawa jang toleran, tidak, tetapi karena pimpinan kabinet sekarang terdiri dari orang2 jang mempunjai perasaan tanggungdjawab jang besar. Sukurlah, bahwa ketika terdjadi Peristiwa Sumatera Hatta tidak memegang fungsi dalam pimpinan negara, walaupun saja tidak ragu adanja sangkutpaut Hatta dengan kedjadian2 itu. Kalau Hatta memegang fungsi penting, apalagi kalau Hatta memegang tampuk pemerinta-han, entah berapa banjak lagi korban jang dibikinnja.

Dalam usaha menjelesaikan Peristiwa Sumatera ada orang2 jang ingin supaja soal kolonel Simbolon "diselesaikan setjara adat", supaja soal "Dewan Banteng" diselesaikan "setjara musjawarat", setjara "potong kerbau" dan dengan "mengguna-kan pepatah dan petitih". Pendeknja, adat, kerbau serta pepatah dan petitih mau dimobilisasi untuk menjelesaikan soal kolonel Simbolon dan soal "Dewan Banteng". Sampai2 orang2, jang tidak beradat djuga berbitjara tentang "penjelesaian setjara adat".

Tetapi, orang-orang ini pada bungkam semua ketika Amir Sjarifuddin dengan tanpa proses ditembus oleh peluru atas perintah Hatta. Ketika Amir Sjarifuddin masih ditahan dipendjara Djokja sebelum dibawa ke Solo dan digiring kedesa Ngalian untuk ditembak, tidak ada seorang Batak atau siapapun jang tampil kedepan, dan mengatakan: "Mari soal Amir Sjarifuddin kita selesaikan setjara adat tanah Batak", atau "Mari soal Amir Sjarifuddin kita selesaikan setjara Kristen".

Saja hanja ingin bertanja: Apakah Amir Sjarifuddin jang bermarga Harahap itu kurang Bataknja daripada kolonel Simbolon sehingga adat Batak mendjadi tidak berlaku bagi dirinja? Saja kira Amir Sjarifuddin tidak kalah Bataknja daripada orang Batak jang mana djuapun, malahan ia tidak kalah Keristennja daripada kebanjakan orang Keristen. Amir Sjarifuddin meninggal sesudah ia menjanjikan lagu Internasionale, lagu Partainja, lagu kesajangannja, dan ia meninggal dengan Kitab Indjil ditangannja. Amir Sjarifuddin adalah putera Batak jang baik, jang patriotik, dan karena itu djuga ia adalah seorang putera Indonesia jang baik. Djadi tidak sepantas-nja adat tanah Batak tidak berlaku baginja.

Bagaimana pula halnja ribuan orang Djawa jang didrel tanpa proses atas perintah Hatta itu ? Apakah suku Djawa jang menderita dari abad keabad tidak mengenal musjawarat dan tidak mengenal pepatah dan petitih sehingga ketika dilantjarkan kampanje pembunuhan terhadap orang2 Djawa selama Peristiwa Madiun tidak ada orang Djawa jang beradat dan tidak ada tjerdik-pandai Djawa jang tampil kedepan untuk menjelesaikan persoalan ketika itu setjara rembugan (musjawarat), setjara adat, .dan dengan berbitjara menggunakan banjak paribasan (peribahasa), dengan potong sapi, potong kerbau, dan dengan mbeleh wedus (potong kambing) ? Ataukah karena pulau Djawa sudah kepadatan penduduk maka pembunuhan atas orang2 Djawa oleh tangan besi burdjuis Minang Mohammad Hatta boleh dibiarkan ? PKI tampil kedepan untuk kepentingan, "de zwijgende Javanen" ("Orang2 Djawa Jang Berdiam Diri") ini, baik mereka Komunis ataupun bukan-Komunis. Ja, djika soal ini dibawa kepengadilan, PKI djuga akan berbitjara atasnama pradjurit2, bintara2 dan perwira2 dari suku Djawa jang mati karena melakukan tugas "membasmi Komunis" jang diperintahkan oleh Hatta. Pradjurit2, bintara2 dan perwira2 jang mati dalam pertempuran melawan Komunis ketika itu adalah tidak bersalah, sama tidak bersalahnja dengan Komunis2 jang mereka tembak. Mereka semuanja adalah korban permainan politik 'perang-saudara Hatta. Tidak hanja kami, sebagai pewaris2 dari pahlawan2 Komunis dalam Peristiwa Madiun, tetapi djuga keluarga para pradjurit, bintara dan perwira TNI jang disuruh "membasmi Komunis" berhak untuk mendakwa Hatta sebagai pembunuh sanak-saudara mereka, djika soal ini dibawa kepengadilan.

Mari sekarang kita lihat bagairnana sikap pemerintah Hatta terhadap perwira jang belum tentu bersalah dalam Peristiwa Madiun, dan bagaimana sikap pemerintah Ali-ldham sekarang terhadap opsir2 jang sudah terang bersalah dalarn pemberontakan2 di Sumatera. Pemerintah Hatta dengan tanpa memeriksa lebih dulu kesalahan mereka terus sadja memetjat perwira2, antara lain jang masih hidup sekarang bekas Djenderal Major Ir. Sakirman, bekas Letnan Kolonel Martono, bekas Major Pramudji, dan banjak lagi. Padahal perwira2 ini belum pernah dipanggil untuk menghadap, apalagi diperiksa; djadi samasekali tidak ada dasar untuk memetjat mereka. Para perwira jang belum tentu bersalah tidak hanja dipetjat, tetapi banjak djuga jang disiksa diluar perikemanusiaan dan dibunuh tanpa dibuktikan kesalahannja terlebih dahulu.

Sekedar untuk mengetahui bagaimana penibunuhan2 kedjam oleh alat-alat resmi ketika itu, bersama ini, saja lampirkan 3 buah turunan laporan resmi dan pengakuan resmi tentang pembunuhan terhadap diri Sidik Aslan dkk. dan terhadap letnan kolonel Dachlan dan major Mustoffa. Untuk menghemat waktu tidak saja batjakan lampiran-Iampiran ini. Lampiran2 ini, saja sampaikan lepas dari penilaian siapa dan bagaimana major Sabarudin, pembuat pengakuan2 tsb. Jang sudah terang major Sabarudin bukan simpatisan PKI, apalagi anggota PKI. Kekedjaman pemerintah Hatta selama Peristiwa Madiun adalah ber-puluh2 kali lebih kedjam daripada pemerintah kolonial Belanda ketika menghadapi pemberontakan Rakjat tahun 1926. Pemerintah kolonial Belanda masih memakai alasan2 hukum untuk membunuh, memendjarakan dan mengasingkan kaum pemberontak, tetapi Hatta sepenuhnja mempraktekkan hukum rimba. Semuanja ini mengingatkan saja kembali pada tulisan Hatta jang berkepala "14 Djuli", dimuat dalam harian "Pemandangan" pada 14 Djuli 1941 dimana antara lain ia menulis tentang Petain, seorang Perantjis boneka Hitler, sebagai "seorang serdadu jang berhati lurus dan djudjur". Hanja serigala mengagumi serigala, hanja fasis mengagumi fasis !

Bandingkanlah sikap pemerintah Hatta terhadap kedjadian di Madiun dengan sikap pemerintah sekarang terhadap kolonel Siinbolon jang sudah terang bersalah karena merebut kekuasaan disebagian wilajah Republik Indonesia, jang sudah terang melanggar disiplin militer atau jang oleh Presiden Sukarno/Panglima Tertinggi dalam amanatnja tanggal 25 Desember 1956 dirumuskan telah berbuat jang "menggon-tjangkan sendi2 ketentaraan dan kenegaraan kita, dan jang membahajakan keutu-han tentara dan negara kita pula". Kolonel Simbolon hanja diberhentikan sementara sebagai Panglima Tentara dan Teritorium I. Sedangkan terhadap pemimpin2 pemberontakan militer di Sumatera Tengah sampai sekarang belum diambil tindakan apa2.

Tentu ada orang2 jang mengatakan: ja, karena Panglima Tertinggi, Pemerintah dan Gabungan Kepala Staf Angkatan Perang sekarang tidak mempunjai kewibawaan, maka mereka tidak menghukum perwira2 tersebut seperti Hatta dulu menghukum perwira2 jang disangka tersangkut dalam Peristiwa Madiun.

Istilah "wibawa" pada waktu belakangan ini banjak dipergunakan orang dengan masing2 mempunjai interpretasinja sendiri2. Kalau dengan istilah "wibawa" jang dimaksudkan jalah kemampuan pemerintah untuk bertindak, maka terang bahwa pemerintah sekarang sanggup bertindak, sanggup memerintah, artinja mempunjai kewibawaan. Apakah bukan tanda wibawa dari pemerintah sekarang dengan dapatnja digulingkan keradjaan sehari komplotan kolonel Simbolon dalam waktu jang sangat singkat ?

Tanggal 22 Desember 1956 pemerintah memutuskan dan mengumumkan pemberhentian sementara kolonel Simbolon sebagai Panglima TT I dan menjerahkan tanggungdjawab TT I kepada letnan-kolonel Djamin Gintings atau letnan-kolonel A. Wahab Macmour. Dalam waktu hanja empat hari, jaitu pada tanggal 27 Desember 1956 komplotan kolonel Simbolon sudah dapat diturunkan dari keradjaan seharinja. Ini artinja bahwa seruan pemerintah dipatuhi, ini artinja pemerintah mempunjai kewibawaan.

Tentu ada orang2 jang berkata lagi: ja, tetapi itu mengenai Sumatera Utara. Mengenai Sumatera Tengah pemerintah tidak mempunjai kewibawaan. Mengenai ini saja djawab sbb. :

Tiap2 orang jang tahu imbangan kekuatan didalam negeri tidak sukar memahamkan, bahwa kalau pemerintah pusat sekarang mau bertindak, apalagi kalau mau bertindak serampangan seperti Hatta, maka dengan pengerahan serentak seluruh kekuatan Angkatan Darat, Angkatan Laut dan Angkatan Udara, dengan dibantu oleh massa Rakjat, maka keradjaan "Dewan Banteng" djuga hanja akan merupakan keradjaan sehari.

Soalnja bukanlah hanja menundjukkan kemampuan menggunakan kekuatan seperti jang pernah dilakukan oleh Hatta, tetapi djuga kebidjaksanaan. Pada pokoknja kami setudju bahwa pemerintah sekarang mengkombinasi kekuatan riilnja dengan kebidjaksanaan. Sikap ini merupakan dasar jang kuat bagi pemerintah, djika pada satu waktu pemerintah harus bertindak keras, karena djalan perundingan sudah tidak mempan lagi.

Walaupun kami kaum Komunis pernah diperlakukan setjara kedjam oleh pemerintah Hatta selama Peristiwa Madiun, tetapi kami tidak menjetudjui djika pemerintah sekarang mentjontoh perbuatan Hatta jang gegabah dan tidak bertanggungdjawab itu. Kita semua mengetahui bahwa politik "tangan besi" Hatta sepenuhnja menguntungkan kepentingan kaum imperialis asing. Ja, walaupuin banjak perwira penganut tjita-tjita PKI jang dibasmi setjara djasmaniah dalam Peristiwa Madiun, tetapi kami tidak menuntut supaja kolonel Simbolon, letnankolonel Abmad Husein dll. dibasmi setjara djasmaniah. Apalagi kami tahu bahwa banjak opsir2 jang tersangkut dalam pemberontakan2 di Sumatera adalah karena hasutan-hasutan sebuah partai ketjil jang keok dalam pemilihan umun, jl. Kami tidak menghendaki penumpahan darah jang disebabkan oleh kehampaan kebidjaksanaan. Djadi apakah jang kami inginkan ?

Kami hanja ingin, supaja disiplin militer berdjalan sebagaimana mestinja, supaja hierarchie ketentaraan ditaati dengan patuh,  supaja Angkatan Perang tetap setia kepada tjita2 Revolusi Agustus 1945, karena hanja dengan demikian kita dapat membangun Angkatan Perang jang mampu membantu menjelesaikan semua tuntutan Revolusi Agustus 1945. Hanja dengan penegakan tatatertib hukum dalam ketentaraan jang berdjiwa Revolusi Agustus 1945 Angkatan Perang kita akan setia kepada sumbernja, jaitu Revolusi dan Rakjat. Sebagaimana sudah saja katakan diatas, ada sementara orang berteriak supaja diadakan penjelesaian "setjara adat", "dengan potong kerbau" dan "dengan menggunakan pepatah dan petitih". Tetapi, djika kita tidak waspada, apakah jang tersembunji dibelakang kata2 ini semuanja? Tidak lain jalah untuk mentjairkan disiplin dalam Angkatan Perang kita, untuk mengatjau-balaukan hierarchie dan tatatertib hukum didalam ketentaraan kita. Saja tidak berkeberatan djika djuga ditempuh djalan setjara adat, kerbau2 dipotongi dan segala matjam pepatah dan petitih nenekmojang digali dan dipakai, karena semuanja ini memang warisan dan milik kita sendiri. Tetapi djangan lupa, bahwa semuanja ini hanialah faktor tambahan. Jang primer bagi orang2 militer jalah tatatertib hukum didalam ketentaraan. Kalau tidak demikian lebih baik perwira2 jang bersangkutan menanggalkan epoletnja dan kembali kekampung untuk duduk dalam lembaga2 adat dikampung. Disanalah barangkali mereka akan menemukan ketenteraman djiwanja.

Sesudah mengkonfrontasikan Peristiwa Madiun 1948 dengan Peristiwa Sumatera 1956, maka sampailah saja pada kesimpulan, bahwa peinerintah Ali-ldham sekarang berpuluh-puluh kali lebih bidjaksana daripada pemerintah Hatta ketika menghadapi kedjadian2 di Madiun dalam bulan September 1948. Ini dilihat dari sudut kebidjak-sanaan. Dilihat dari sudut kewibawaan pemerintah Ali-Idham mempunjai kewiba-waan, dibuktikan oleh ketaatan alat2nja pada umumnja. Jang tidak mentaati pemerintah sekarang hanja minoritet iang sangat ketjil jang sudah diratjuni oleh sebuah partai ketjil dan oknum2 liar jang tidak melihat haridepannja dalam demo-krasi, tetapi dalam sesuatu kekuasaan militeris-fasis. Adalah djanggal dan tidak bertanggungdjawab djika pemerintah Ali-Idham menjerah kepada ambisi partai ketjil dan oknum2 liar ini.

Selandjutnja dapat pula ditarik kesimpulan, bahwa adalah perbuatan jang tidak bertanggungdjawab untuk memberi kans sekali lagi kepada Mohamad Hatta, bapak perang-saudara, seorang jang karena haus kekuasaan dan pendek akal telah menewaskan be-ribu2 Rakjat dan pemuda baik orang2 sipil maupun orang2 militer kita jang baik2.

Dwitunggal Tidak Pernah Ada

Sementara orang tentu akan bertanja: Tetapi bagaimana dengan "dwitunggal"? Per-tama2 perlu saja njatakan bahwa dwitunggal tidak pernah ada, bahwa dwitunggal hanja ada dalam dunia impian orang2 jang tidak mengerti seluk-beluk sedjarah perdjuangan kemerdekaan dan sedjarah pentjetusan Revolusi Agustus 1945.

Kalau orang mau tenang dan mau meng-ingat2 kembali pada pertentangan pendapat jang sengit antara Sukarno dengan "Partai Indonesia" (Partindo) disatu fihak dan Hatta-Sjahrir dengan apa jang dinamakan "Pendidikan Nasional Indonesia" difihak lain, maka orang akan sependapat bahwa dwitunggal jang sungguh2 memang tidak pernah ada. Untuk pertama kali, pada kesempatan ini ingin saja njatakan, bahwa saja sudah lama merasa ikut berdosa karena sudah ambil bagian aktif dalam gerakan memaksa Hatta menandatangani Proklamasi 17 Agustus 1945. Hatta sudah sedjak semula setjara ngotot menentang pentjetusan Revolusi Agustus. la menggantungkan kemerdekaan Indonesia sepenuhnja pada rachmat Saikoo Sikikan (Panglima Tertinggi Tentara Djepang di Indonesia) jang tidak kundjung tiba itu.

Saja merasa lebih2 ikut berdosa lagi ketika membatja pidato Hatta waktu menerima gelar Dr. HC dari Universitas "Gadjah Mada" dimana dengan tegas dikatakannja bahwa revolusi harus dibendung. Kalau saja tidak salah Universitas "Gadjah Mada" sudah tiga kali memberikan gelar kehormatan, pertama kepada Presiden Sukarno, kedua kepada Hatta dan ketiga kepada Ki Hadjar Dewantara. Pemberian jang pertama dan ketiga, menurut pendapat saja, adalah tepat, karena Universitas "Gadjah Mada" jang dilahirkan oleh revolusi memberikan gelar kehormatan kepada orang2 revolusioner, pengabdi2 revolusi. Tetapi pemberian jang kedua, jaitu pada Hatta, maaf, adalah satu kekeliruan jang mungkln tidak disengadja. Betapa tidak keliru, sebuah universitas jang dilahirkan oleh revolusi memberikan gelar kehormatan kepada seorang jang ingin membendung revolusi, kepada seorang kontra-revolusioner.

Dwitunggal jang terdiri dari seorang revolusioner dan jang seorang lagi kontra-revolusioner samasekali bukan dwitunggal. Oleh karena itulah saja katakan, dwitunggal tidak pernah ada, ketjuali didalam dongengan dan impian. Dongengan tentang dwitunggal inilah jang antara lain telah membikin revolusi kita mendjadi matjet, karena dwitunggal jang di-bikin2 itu, jang heterogeen itu, telah membikin kita terdjepit diantara dua kutub, kutub revolusi dan kutub kontra-revolusi. Selama lebih sebelas tahun Rakjat Indonesia sudah ditipu dengan apa jang dinamakan dwitunggal.

Revolusi kita berdjalan terus, semua kekuatan revolusioner harus dipersatukan dan dimobilisasi untuk mengalahkan kekuatan2 kontra-revolusioner.

Demikianlah, penilaian saja mengenai kebidjaksanaan pemerintah sekarang, sesudah saja mengkonfron-tasikan kebidjaksanaan pemerintah sekarang dengan kebidjaksanaan pemerintah Hatta ditahun 1948. Saja dipaksa untuk memberikan penilaian setjara ini, karena ada salahseorang anggota Parlemen kita jang dalam pemandangan umumnja membawa-bawa Peristiwa Madiun.

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Jalan Baru

Kata pengantar

Dengan penerbitan ini entah berapa puluh ribu "Djalan Baru" sudah disiarkan. Sedjak terbitnja, bulan Agustus 1948, "Djalan Baru" sudah disiarkan dengan segala matjam djalan : ditjetak, distensil, ditik, dan ditulis. la ditjetak di Djawa, ia ditjetak diluarnegeri oleh Partai sekawan, ia distensil di Sumatera, Sulawesi, dll. Pendeknja, "Djalan Baru" sudah banjak tersiar. Walaupun demikian, mengingat pentingnja isi buku ketjil ini, kita berpendapat bahwa "Djalan Baru" belum tjukup banjak disiarkan. Oleh karena itu, kali ini kita terbitkan lagi "Djalan Baru". Kita akan sangat bergembira djika djuga diusahakan penerbitan jang banjak dalam bahasa2 daerah seperti bahasa Djawa, Sunda, Madura, Minangkabau, Bugis dll.

"Djalan Baru" tidak hanja penting untuk anggota dan tjalon-anggota PKI. Tiap2 orang revolusioner dan progresif di Indonesia jang mau bekerdja baik untuk kemenangan revolusi tanahairnja diwadjibkan menguasai isi "Djalan Baru". Untuk mengerti PKI dan mengerti Revolusi Indonesia, hingga sekarang hanja "Djalan Baru" satu-satunja jang bisa rnemberi pendjelasan; isinja padat dan menggambarkan strategi jang djitu dan taktik2 jang tepat dalam tingkat perdjuangan nasional sekarang. Memang, diakui bahwa ada perkataan2 dan kalimat2 jang rnasih perlu dirubah (misalnja perkataan RIS supaja dibatja RI). Perlunja ada perubahan2 dalam bahasa ini, perubahan mana samasekali tidak mengubah isinja, adalah tidak mengurangi sedikitpun pentingnja "Djalan Baru", sebagai pedoman untuk pekerdjaan2 politik dan organisasi se-hari2.

"Djalan Baru" adalah dasar dari fikiran Kawan Musso, seorang zeni revolusioner bangsa Indonesia, seorang Kawan jang djudjur, ichlas, tadjam dan berani. Musso mempuniai tjaranja sendiri dalam melawan imperialisme dan melawan Musuh2 Rakjat, jaitu tjara jang keras, tjara jang tidak kenal ampun atau tjara Musso. "Djalan Baru" menggambarkan pada kita apa jang dinamakan tjara Musso itu. Setjara singkat: "Djalan Baru" adalah perdjuangan jang tidak mengenal ampun terhadap oportunisme "Kiri" dan Kanan didalam dan diluar partai.

Djakarta, 23 Mei 1951.

Redaksi "Bintang Merah"

Keterangan Penerbit pada tjetakan ke-VI

Sebagaimana diterangkan dalam Kata Pengantar dari Red. "Bintang Merah", "Djalan Baru" ini telah banjak sekali disiarkan dengan berbagai djalan. Sekalipun demikian, sekarang masih sangat banjak kami terima permintaan akan "Djalan Baru" ini. Karena persediaan dari tjetakan ke-V jang diterbitkan oleh "Bintang Merah" telah habis terdjual, maka kami lakukan tjetakan jang ke-VI ini.

Penerbit

Djakarta, Djuli 1952.

Keterangan Penerbit pada tjetakan ke-Vll

Tjetakan jang ke-VII dari "Djalan Baru" ini sebenarnja sudah hendak dilakukan satu -- dua bulan jang lalu karena banjaknja Permintaan, sedangkan tietakan jang ke-VI sudah lama habis. Tetapi atas permintaan CC PKI, Pentjetakan kembali jang ke-Vll ini telah ditunda, karena akan ada kemungkinan perubahan2. Demikianlah dalam tjetakan ke-VII ini telah diadakan perubahan2 oleh CC PKI atas dasar putusan Sidang Plenonja pada bulan Oktober 1953.

Penerbit

Djakarta, 5 Oktober 1953.

Rapat Polit-Biro CC PKI pada tgl 13-14 Agustus 1948 di Djokjakarta, setelah mendengar uraian Kawan Musso tentang pekerdjaan dan kesalahan Partai dalam dasar2 organisasi dan politik serta setelah mengadakan diskusi se-dalam2nja memutuskan, mengambil resolusi seI bagai berikut :

I  Lapangan organisasi

Untuk dapat memahamkan kesalahan2 PKI dilapangan organisasi, sebaiknja diuraikan lebih dahulu sedikit riwajat PKI.

Dalam tahun 1935 PKI dibangunkan kembali setjara illegal atas inisiatif Kawan Musso. Selandjutnja PKI illegal inilah jang memimpin perdjuangan anti-fasis selama pendudukan Djepang. Kesalahan pokok dilapangan organisasi jang dibuat oleh PKI illegal jalah, tidak dimengertinja perubahan2 keadaan politik didalamnegeri sesudah Proklamasi Kemerdekaan Indonesia. Sebenarnja pada saat itulah, PKI harus melepaskan bentuknja jang illegal dan muntjul dalam masjarakat Indonesia Merdeka dengan terang2an.

Akan tetapi karena pada saat itu dan seterusnja bentuk jang illegal ini masih dipegang teguh, maka dengan demikian PKI telah mendorong orang2 jang menghendaki adanja PKI, untuk medirikan PKI legal, dan telah memberi kesempatan kepada anasir2 avonturir jang berhaluan Trotskis untuk mendirikan PBI. Dengan berdirinja PKI legal dan PBI ini, maka timbullah keharusan bagi PKI illegal untuk merebut se-lekas2nja pimpinan atas Partai2 ini, supaja perdjuangan klas buruh djangan sampai menjimpang dari rel revolusioner. Dengan sendirinja keharusan ini mengakibatkan terbagi-baginja kader illegal kita, jang sudah tentu melemahkan organisasi.

Oleh sebagian kawan2 dari PKI illegal, didirikan Partai Sosialis Indonesia, jang, kemudian membuat kesalahan besar karena mengadakan fusi dengan Partai Rakjat Sosialis dari Sutan Sjahrir dan mendjeIma mendjadi Partai Sosialis. Dengan adanja fusi ini, maka terbukalah djalan bagi Sutan Sjahrir dan kawan2nja untuk memperkuda Partai Sosialis. Kedjadian ini dmungkinkan oleh kurang sedar dan kurang waspadanja kawan2 dari PKI illegal jang turut mengemudikan Partai Sosialis.

Kemudian tidak sedikit djum]ah kader2 illegal kita jang diperlukan baik didalam Pemerintahan maupun didalarn Badan Pekerdja KNIP. Sehingga dengan sendirinja tidak mungkin lagi bagi kawan2 ini mentjurahkan segenap tenaganja kepada pekerdjaan dalam ketiga Partai tsb. diatas (PKI legal, PBI, Partai Sosialis). Hal ini lebih melemahkan organisasi.

Berhubung dengan semua ini, maka kedudukan dan rol Partai Komunis Indonesia sebagai Partai klas buruh dan pelopor revolusi telah diperketjil. PKI ditempatkan pada tempat jang tidak semestinja, sehingga sebagai Partai dan organisasi samasekali tidak mewudjudkan kekuatan jang berarti. Dengan demikian sangat berkuranglah tradisi baik dan popularitet PKI dalam waktu sebelum dan selama perang dunia ke-II. Kesalahan besar dalam lapangan organisasi ini diperbesar lagi, karena kaum Komunis sangat mengetjilkan kekuatan klas buruh dan Rakjat seluruhnja dan karena kaum Komunis terpengaruh oleh propaganda dan antjaman Amerika. Oleh sebab itu telah mendjadi takut dan kurang pertjaja kepada kekuatan tenaga anti-imperialis jang dipelopori oleh Soviet Uni. Dengan demikian PKI membesar-besarkan kekuatan imperialisme umumnja dan imperialisme Amerika chususnja. Dengan demikian pula PKI memberikan terlampau banjak konsesi kepada imperialisme dan klas burdjuis.

Adanja tiga Partai klas buruh sampai sekarang (PKI legal, PBI dan Partai Sosialis), jang semuanja dipimpin oleh Partai Komunis illegal, mengakui dasar2 Marxisme-Leninisme dan sekarang tergabung dalam Front Demoktasi Rakjat serta mendjalan-kan aksi bersama berdasarkan program bersama, telah mengakibatkan ruwetnja gerakan buruh seumumnja. Hal ini sangat menghalangi kemadjuan dan perkem-bangan kekuatan organisasi klas buruh, djuga sangat menghalangi meluas dan mendalamnja ideologi Marxisme-Leninisme jang konsekwen. Dengan demikian telah memberi banjak kesempatan kepada musuh klas buruh untuk menghalangi kema-djuan gerakan Komunis dengan djalan mendirikan ber-matjam2 Partai Kiri jang palsu dan jang memakai sembojan2 jang semestinja mendjadi sembojan PKI (diantaranja : "Perundingan atas dasar Kemerdekaan 100%").

Oleh karena sikap jang anti-Leninis dalam hal politik organisasi ini, maka dilapangan serikatburuhpun kaum Komunis dengan demikian telah sangat menghalangi tumbuhnja keinsafan politik kaum buruh seumumnja sebagai pemimpin Revolusi Nasional. Kaum Komunis jang merninipin gerakan buruh (serikatburuh) lupa, bahwa menurut Lenin serikatburuh itu adalah sekolahan untuk Komunisme. Melalaikan propaganda Komunisme dikalangan kaum buruh, berarti dengan langsung mengha-langi bertambah sedarnja kaum buruh sebagai pemimpin Revolusi Nasional jang anti-imperialisme dan anti-feodalisme. Berarti melupakan arti gerakan kaum buruh sebagai sumber jang terpenting bagi PKI untuk mendapat kader2nja.

Pengaruh daripada kesalahan dalam lapangan organisasi jang telah dilakukan oleh kaum Komunis dengan djelas dan terang nampak djuga dikalangan perdjuangan tani, dimana pengaruh PKI djuga sangat lemah. Padahal kaum tani amat besar artinja sebagai sekutu kaum buruh dalam Revolusi Nasional. Dengan tidak adanja bantuan jang aktif dari kaum tani, Revolusi Nasional tentu akan kalah.

Dari sudut organisasi kaum Komunis mempunjai pengaruh jang tidak ketjil dikalangan pemuda, terutama dalam Pesindo, Akan tetapi karena gerakan ini tidak langsung terkenal sebagai massa organisasi PKI, sedangkan PKI sebagai Partai tidak terang2an memeloporinja, maka ideologi Komunisme dikalangan pemuda terbukti kurang terang dan ruwet, sehingga pendirian pemuda ragu2. Akibat jang langsung dari politik organisasi sematjam ini jalah, terhalangnja kemadjuan perkem-bangan propaganda Komunisme dikalangan pemuda. Pun dikalangan wanita, kaum Komunis tidak mempunjai pengaruh jang agak penting. Terang bahwa kaum Komunis mengetjilkan rol kaum wanita dalam Revolusi sekarang.

Dikalangan pradjurit, kaum Komunis mempunjai pengaruh jang agak penting djuga. Akan tetapi karena adanja tiga Partai kaum buruh, maka kaum proletar dan kaum tani jang bersendjata ini dalam prakteknja tidak bersikap terang terhadap PKI dan dengan demikian simpati golongan pradjurit pada Komunisme tidak dapat diperluas. Dilapangan organisasi, PKI tidak mempunjai akar jang kuat dan dalam dikalangan pradjurit.

Semua keruwetan dalam lapangan organisasi djuga menjebabkan tidak kuatnja PKI dalam gerakan sosial dan kebudajaan seperti sport, kesenian dll.nja, baik dalam lapangan organisasi maupun dalam lapangan ideologi. Berhubung dengan kesalahan2 jang mengenai azas dalam lapangan organisasi seperti tsb. diatas dan menarik peladjaran dengan se-baik2nja dari kedjadian di Jugoslavia, maka rapat Polit-Biro PKI memutuskan untuk mengadakan perubahan jang radikal, jang bertudjuan supaja :

1.         Selekas-lekasnja mengembalikan kedudukan PKI sebagai pelopor klas buruh.

2.         Selekas-lekasnja mengembalikan tradisi PKI jang baik pada waktu sebelum dan selama perang dunia ke-II.

3          PKI mendapat HEGEMONI (kekuasaan jang terbesar) dalam pimpinan Revolusi Nasional ini.

Dalam pekerdjaan jang maha sukar ini, Polit-Biro jakin, bahwa PKI akan dapat melakukan perubahan radikal tersebut diatas dengan tjepat. Waktu achir2 ini, kalangan kaum Komunis sendiri, oleh karena pekerdjaan sehari2 dikalangan Rakjat lebih diperhatikan dan bertambah terasanja keruwetan dan kekatjauan, telah mulai mentjari djalan untuk keluar dari djurang reformisme dengan mengadakan kritik dan self-kritik, terutama didalam rapat pleno CC PKI tgl. 10-11 Djuni 1948 dan dalam rapat Polit-Biro tgl. 2 Djuli 1948. Akan tetapi oleh karena kritik dan self-kritik ini belum benar2 merdeka dan bersifat bolsjewik, maka rapat tsb. belum dapat mengetahui kesalahan2 jang benar2 mengenai strategi dalam lapangan organisasi maupun politik. Akan tetapi selama pertukaran fikiran dengan Kawan Musso dalam rapat Polit-Biro kritik dan self-kritik didjalankan dengan leluasa. Semua anggota Polit-Biro seia-sekata mengakui kesalahan2nja dengan terus-terang dan sanggup akan memperbaiki seIekas-Iekasnja.

Djalan satu2nja untuk melikwidasi kesalahan pokok itu dengan tjara radikal jalah mengadakan hanja SATU Partai jang LEGAL daripada klas buruh. Ini berarti dihapuskannja pimpinan PKI jang illegal. Seperti tsb. diatas, PKI jang dibangunkan kembali oleh Kawan Musso setjara illegal pada tahun 1935 itu melandjutkan perdjuangannja pada waktu pendjadjahan Djepang sampai zaman Republik, dan hingga waktu ini masih memimpin gerakan anti-imperialis.

PKI illegal ini hingga sekarang didjadikan sasaran oleh kaum Trotskis jang langsung atau tidak langsung tergabung dalam Pari, dengan maksud untuk mengatjaukan gerakan Rakjat dengan mengatakan, bahwa PKI itu adalah PKI jang diperkuda oleh Belanda atau "PKI Van der Plas", artinja PKI jang didirikan untuk kepentingan Belanda. Tuduhan ini lebih2 lagi menundjukkan ketjurangan golongan Trotskis untuk membusukkan PKI illegal, jang benar dibangunkan kembali oleh Kawan Musso dengan kawan2 jang lain, diantaranja kawan2 almarhum Pamudji, Sukajat, Abdul Aziz, Abdul Rachim dan kawan2 Djokosudjono, Achmad Sumadi, Ruskak, Marsaid, kemudian diteruskan oleh kawan2 Amir Sjarifuddin, Wikana, Sudisman, Sardjono, Subijanto almarhum, Sutrisno, Aidit dll.

Semua kesalahan2 dilapangan politik organisasi jang tsb. diatas, pada pokoknja jalah mengetjilkan rol Partai Komunis Indonesia sebagai satu2nja kekuatan jang seharusnja memegang pimpinan daripada klas buruh dalam mendjalankan revolusi. Berdasarkan itu, maka rapat Polit-Biro PKI telah memutuskan, bahwa seterusnja harus hanja ada satu Partai jang berdasarkan Marxisme-Leninisme dalam kalangan kaum Buruh. Polit-Biro PKI memutuskan mengadjukan usul, supaja diantara tiga Partai jang mengakui dasar2 Marxisme-Leninisme jang sekarang telah tergabung dalam Front Demokrasi Rakjat serta telah mendjalankan aksi bersama, berdasarkan program bersama, selekas-lekasnja diadakan fusi (peleburan)*), sehingga mendjadi SATU Partai klas buruh dengan memakai nama jang bersedjarah, jaitu Partai Komunis Indonesia, disingkat PKI. Hanja Partai sedemikian itulah jang akan dapat memegang rol sebagai pelopor dalam gerakan Kemerdekaan sekarang ini.

Revolusi kita adalah Revolusi Nasional atau Revolusi Demokrasi Burdjuis dalam zaman imperialisme dan Revolusi Proletar dunia. Menurut kodratnja dan dipandang dari sudut sedjarah maka hanja klas buruhlah, sebagai klas jang paling revolusioner dan konsekwen anti-imperialisme, jang semestinja memimpin revolusi ini, dan bukan klas lain. Adapun tjara mewudjudkan fusi ini dengan selekas-lekasnja bendaknja sbb.:

1.         Membersihkan PKI dari anasir2 jang tidak baik.

2.         Membentuk Komite Fusi jang berkewadjiban:

a.         Mendaftar anggota 2 PBI dan Partai Sosialis jang dapat diusulkan dengan segera mendjadi anggota PKI.

b.         Menjiapkan masuknja anggota2 lainnja jang masih kurang madju dengan memberi kepada mereka, kewadjiban untuk mempeladjari buku-buku Marxisme-Leninisme, kursus2, pekerdjaan jang tertentu dsb.

3.         Setelah semua ini selesai, lalu mengadakan Kongres Fusi daripada ketiga Partai, dimana ketiga Partai dilebur mendjadi satu dengan memakai nama Partai Komunis Indonesia dan dipilih Central Comite jang baru setjara demokratis.

Dengan adanja hanja satu Partai klas buruh jaitu PKI, maka pekerdjaan akan mendjadi lebih sederhana dan rasionil. Adanja satu PKI jang legal, rnemudahkan dan menegaskan pekerdjaan tiap2 Komunis dalam serikat buruh, dalam perdjuangan tani, pemuda, wanita, dalam gerakan sosial dll.

Oleh karena PKI adalah Partai klas jang miskin dan jang tertindas, seharusnja susunan pimpinan dan susunan Partai seluruhnja sebagian besar terdiri dari elemen2 proletar sedangkan kaum intelektuil seharusnja mendjadi Pembantu jang tidak dapat diabaikan dalam semua hal terutama dalam pekerdjaan pembentukan kader2 dan dalam mempertinggi tingkatan teori anggota PKI. Kesalahan2 pokok hingga sekarang, disebabkan pula oleh karena kurangnja elemen-elemen proletar dalam pimpinan Partai.

Rapat Polit-Biro memperkuat putusan CC PKI untuk membentuk suatu organisasi-massa baru, jalah : "Lembaga Persahabatan Indonesia-Soviet Uni". Ini perlu sekali, oleh karena di Indonesia terdapat sangat banjak orang jang bersimpati kepada Soviet Uni dan jang masih segan memasuki PKI. Perlu sekali adanja lembaga itu, supaja Rakjat djelata mengetahui lebih banjak tentang Soviet Uni, supaja Rakjat djelata mempunjai kepertjajaan lebih besar kepada gerakan demokrasi Rakjat jang dipimpin oleh Soviet Uni. Kekuatan Soviet Uni dan kekuatan2 anti-imperialis lainnja diseluruh dunia sebenarnja adalah djauh lebih besar daripada kekuatan blok imperialisme jang dipimpin oleh Amerika Serikat, jang djuga bemiat mendjadjah kembali tanahair kita.

II Lapangan politik

Politik luarnegeri

Dalam lapangan politik luarnegeri, rapat Polit-Biro berpendapat, bahwa kesalahan2 besar jang telah dibuat oleh kaum Komunis Indonesia selama tiga tahun ini tidak bersifat kebetulan, melainkan mempunjai akar jang berasal semendjak meletusnja perang dunia II dan pendudukan tanahair kita oleh Djepang dan jang selandjutnja dipengaruhi oleh pendirian jang salah dari partai2 sekawan, jaitu Partai-partai Komunis Eropa Barat (Perantjis, Inggris dan Belanda).

Pendirian politik jang salah dari Partai2 Komunis di Eropa Barat ini pada umumnja, jalah karena tidak dimengertinja perubahan2 jang besar dilapangan politik internasional dan perubahan2 keadaan dinegerinja masing2 sesudah perang dunia II berachir dengan hantjumja negeri2 fasis Djerman, Italia dan Djepang. Semendjak perang dunia II meletus, maka gerakan kaum buruh revolusioner di-negeri2 kapitalis, untuk sementara waktu, harus melakukan politik bekerdja-sama dengan semua tenaga-anti-fasis dinegerinja masing2 termasuk pemerintah Amerika, Inggris, Perantjis, Belanda dsb. Pun djuga gerakan revolusioner dari Rakjat di-negeri2 djadjahan, untuk sementara harus melakukan politik sematjam itu.

Setelah Soviet Uni terlibat dalam perang dunia II karena serangan fasis Djerman, maka bagi Soviet Uni djuga timbul keharusan untuk erat bekerdja bersama dengan negara2 besar jang bersekutu melawan negeri2 fasis.

Semuanja bermaksud memperhebat perlawanan terhadap penjerang2 fasis, musuh jang paling berbahaja pada waktu itu, bukan sadja bagi negeri2 kapitalis dan imperialis, tetapi djuga bagi Soviet Uni, bagi gerakan buruh revolusioner di-negeri2 kapitalis dan imperialis dan bagi gerakan revolusioner dari Rakjat dinegeri djadjahan. Setelah perang dunia II berachir dengan hantjurnja ketiga negeri fasis tadi, maka bagi Partai2 Komunis dinegeri2 kapitalis dan imperialis dan bagi perdjuangan revolusioner di-negeri2 djadjahan sudah tidak ada alasan lagi untuk melandjutkan kerdjasama dengan pemerintahnja masing2. Apalagi sesudah ternjata, bahwa kaum burdjuis sudah mulai menggunakan tjara-tjara untuk menindas gerakan kemerdekaan dinegeri djadjahannja.

Kesalahan dari Partai2 Komunis Perantjis dan Inggris dan djuga Partai Komunis Belanda jang terpengaruh oleh Partai Komunis Perantjis, jalah karena tidak dimengertinja perubahan besar jang telah berlaku dalam lapangan politik interna-sional sesudah perang dunia, terutama jang mengenai perdjuangan kemerdekaan dari Rakjat di-negeri2 djadjahan.

Pada saat perang dunia II berachir dengan hantjurnja negeri2 fasis, maka perdjuangan kemerdekaan di-negeri2 djadjahan harus dikobar-kobarkan lagi dengan sehebat-hebatnja dan Partai2 Komunis di-negeri2 pendjadjah harus menjokong se-kuat2nja. Kerdjasama dalam perdjuangan kemerdekaan Rakjat jang didjadjah dengan negeri2 imperialis sudah tidak lagi pada tempatnja!

Akan tetapi, karena tidak faham tentang perubahan keadaan politik ini, maka CPN (Partai Komunis Belanda) beranggapan, bahwa perdjuangan Rakjat Indonesia tidak boleh keluar dari batas dominion status dan oleh karenanja sembojan jang paling baik untuk Indonesia menurut pendirian mereka jalah: "Uni-verband", atau dengan perkataan lain: tetap tinggal dalam lingkungan "Commonwealth" Belanda. Djadi Rakjat Indonesia harus terus-menerus "kerdjasama" dengan imperialisme Belanda. Demikian pula pendirian Partai Komunis Perantjis terhadap perdjuangan kemer-dekaan Vietnam...

Hal jang tidak boleh dilupakan jalah, bahwa di Indonesia selama pendudukan Djepang sudah ada Komunis2 palsu dan komunis2--renegat (penghianat), jang suka mendjalankan kerdjasama dilapangan politik dengan fasis Djepang.

Politik jang reformis dari Partai2 Komunis di-negeri2 Eropa Barat, disebabkan karena tidak fahamnja akan perubahan2 keadaan internasional jang penting sesudah perang dunia II berachir. Oleh kawan2 bekas anggota CPN jang tiba di Indonesia, dengan otomatis dengan tidak dipikirkan dalam-dalam, djuga dengan tidak ditjotjok-kan dengan keadaan objektif (proklamasi kemerdekaan tanggal 17-8 tahun 1945), politik reformis ini telah dipraktekkan, sehingga akibatnja sangat membahajakan kemadjuan Revolusi Nasional kita. Perlu ditegaskan, bahwa politik reformis jang berasal dari luarnegeri ini djustru memberi kesempatan berkembangnja aliran reformis jang menguasai politik luarnegeri Republik dan jang dipimpin oleh kaum sosialis kanan (Sutan Sjahrir). Politik reformis ini dapat dinjatakan dengan dua hal :

1.         Mentjari keuntungan dan bantuan dengan kerdjasama, bukan dengan golongan anti-imperialis melainkan dengan golongan imperialis. Jaitu dengan rnengguna-kan pertentangan2 diantara imperialisme Inggris dan Amerika dan diantara imperialisme Inggris dan imperialisme Belanda. Pada permulaannja imperialisme Inggrislah jang diadjaknja bermain-mata. Dasar daripada politik reformis ini diletakkan dalam Manifes Politik Pemerintah Republik November 1945.

2.         Menghadapi imperialisme Belanda tidak dengan perdjuangan jang konsekwen revolusioner dan anti-imperialis, melainkan dengan politik reaksioner atau politik kompromis jang bersembojan: "bukan kemenangan militer jang dimaksudkan, melainkan kemenangan politik". Djadi bukannja perdjuangan dengan sendjata jang diutamakan, melainkan perdjuangan politik, sedangkan, imperialisme Belanda terus-menerus berusaha memperkuat tenaga militernja.

Kaum Komunis jang membiarkan berkembangnja dan meradjalelanja politik reaksioner ini, malahan turut serta menjokongnja, telah membuat dua matjam kesalahan :

a.         Lupa akan peladjaran teori revolusioner kita, bahwa Revolusi Nasional anti-imperialis dizaman sekarang ini sudah mendjadi bagian daripada Revolusi Proletar dunia. Kesimpulan daripada peladjaran ini jalah, bahwa Revolusi Nasional di Indonesia harus berhubungan erat dengan tenaga2 anti-imperialis lainnja didunia, jaitu perdjuangan revolusioner diseluruh dunia, baik di-negeri2 djadjahan atau negeri setengahdjadjahan, maupun di-negeri2 kapitalis-imperialis. Sebab semua ini adalah sekutu daripada Revolusi Nasional kita. Negeri Soviet Uni sebagai tenaga anti-imperialis jang terbesar dan terkuat harus dipandang sebagai pangkalan, sebagai benteng jang terkuat, atau sebagai pemimpin dan pelopor daripada semua perdjuangan anti-imperialis diseluruh dunia. Sebab hanja ada dua golongan didunia jang berhadapan dan berlawanan satu sama lainnja, jaitu golongan imperialis dan golongan anti-imperialis. Bagi Revolusi Nasional Indonesia, tidak ada tempat lain selainnja difihak golongan anti-imperialis! Hanja dari fihak golongan anti-imperialis sebagai sekutu jang sedjati, Revolusi Nasional Indonesia dapat memperoleh keuntungan dan bantuan jang diperlukan, dan bukan dari fihak golongan imperialis.

b.         Kesalahan jang kedua jalah, bahwa tidak tjukup dimengerti perimbangan kekuatan antara Soviet Uni dan imperialisme Inggris-USA, setelah Soviet Uni berhasil dengan sangat tjepatnja menduduki seluruh Tung Pai (Mansjuria). Pada waktu itu sudah ternjata kedudukan Soviet Uni jang sangat kuat dibenua Asia, jang mengikat banjak tenaga militer daripada imperialisme USA, Inggris dan Australia dan dengan demikian memberi kesempatan baik bagi Rakjat Indonesia untuk memulai revolusinja. Pada saat itu kaum Komunis Indonesia sudah membesar-besarkan kekuatan Belanda dan imperialisme lainnja dan mengetjilkan kekuatan Revolusi Indonesia serta golongan anti-imperialis lainnja.

Konsekwensi jang sudah semestinja dari politik kaum sosialis kanan (Sutan Sjahrir) jang reaksioner itu, jalah penanda-tanganan truce agreement 1946 dan selandjutnja penanda-tanganan persetudjuan Linggadjati jang memungkinkan imperialisme Belanda menjiapkan perang kolonial, jang meletus pada tanggal 21 Djuli 1947.

Akibat kesalahan pokok dalam lapangan politik tidak habis disitu sadja; konsekwensi jang lebih mentjelakakan lagi jalah tidak lain daripada penanda-tanganan persetu-djuan Renville. Persetudjuan Renville ini adalah puntjak akibat kesalahan2 jang reaksioner, jang telah membawa Republik pada tepi djurang kolonialisme. Tanggung-djawab jang berat ini terletak dipundak kaum Komunis.

Kesalahan selandjutnja jang besar pula jalah bahwa kabinet Amir Sjarifuddin mengundurkan diri dengan sukarela dan dengan tidak ada perlawanan samasekali. Kaum Komunis pada waktu itu tidak ingat akan peladjaran Lenin: "Soal pokok daripada tiap revolusi adalah soal kekuasaan negara". Dengan bubarnja kabinet Amir Sjarifuddin terbukalah djalan bagi elemen2 burdjuis komprador untuk memegang pimpinan pemerintahan dan dengan demikian djuga pimpinan Revolusi Nasional kita, sedangkan kaum Komunis mengisolasi dirinja dalam oposisi. Dapat dlkatakan, bahwa saat itulah Revolusi Nasional kita benar2 berada dalam bahaja, jang makin lama makin mendjadi besar. Sedjak saat itulah Revolusi Nasional kita makin lama makin djelas merosot kedalam djurang kapitulasi (penjerahan) kepada imperialisme Belanda cs, akibat politik kompromis jang sangat reaksioner daripada elemen2 burdjuis Indonesia jang memegang pimpinan pemerinta-han.

Politik kompromis jang reaksioner ini makin menguntungkan imperialisme Belanda dan makin membesarkan bahaja bagi Republik kita. Sesudah kaum Komunis tidak  lagi duduk didalam pemerintahan dan setelah mereka, mulai giat bekerdja  dikalangan Rakjat djelata, maka mereka mulai sedar akan kesalahan2 dan keku-rangan-kekurangannja, diantara lain kelemahan2 organisasi Partai serta organisasi massa, terutama dikalangan kaum buruh dan tani. Mereka mulai insaf, bahwa ter-utama harus diusahakan penjelesaian soal agraria dengan se-lekas2nja, jang dahulunja sangat kurang mendapat perhatian mereka, padahal masaalah tani adalah masaalah jang penting bagi Revolusi Nasional Indonesia.

Djuga mulai diinsafi, bahwa dengan tidak adanja sokongan, terutama dari Rakjat pekerdja (buruh, tani-pekerdja dan pekerdja lainnja) jang berorganisasi rapi, tidaklah mungkin mewudjudkan hegemoni klas buruh dalam Revolusi National kita ini, dan tidak mungkin pula membentuk suatu pemerintahan kerakjatan jang kuat dan stabil (jang berdiri tegak). Oleh karenanja kaum Komunis berdaja-upaja dengan segiat-giatnja mengorganisasi massa Rakjat pekerdja, agar dalam waktu jang pendek dapat menjusun massa-organisasi jang rapi dalam berbagal kalangan Rakjat pekerdja, jang berkewadjiban mendjalankan rol sebagai tulang-punggung Revolusi Nasional kita. Ternjata bahwa didalam 6 bulan jang belakangan ini, sedjak pimpinan negara dipegang oleh elemen2 burdjuis komprador, tumbuhnja politik jang reaksioner berdjalan dengan tjepatnja. Malahan pada beberapa bulan jang belakangan sudah tampak tanda2, bahwa politik pemerintah jang reaksioner itu akan tumbuh ketingkatan kontra-revolusioner.

Hal ini sebagian disebabkan, karena agitasi dan propaganda dari fihak kaum Komunis untuk menjedarkan massa Rakjat pekerdja tentang kekeliruan2 politik pemerintah, disana-sini telah didjalankan dengan tjara jang kurang bidjaksana, hingga menjinggung perasaan. Akan tetapi sebagian lagi disebabkan, karena tindakan2 jang reaksioner dari fihak pemerintah terhadap hak2 demokrasi Rakjat pekerdja, sedangkan Rakjat pekerdja sudah makin sedar akan rol dan kewadjibannja serta hak2nja dalam Revolusi Nasional. Tindakan2 reaksioner jang telah njata diantaranja jalah :

a.         Penghapusan hak2 demokrasi jang pokok misalnja hak berdemon-strasi, walaupun buat sementara.

b.         Niat untuk mengekang hak mogok bagi kaum buruh, dengan tidak mengindahkan samasekali faktor2 jang njata, jaitu jang memaksa kaum buruh menggunakan sendjata perdjuangannja jang paling tadjam itu untuk membela nasibnja dan membela Revolusi Nasional.

c.         Politik dalam lapangan dkonomi jang terang-terangan reaksioner, jang menentang dan memperkosa UUD Republik kita fasal 33 dan jang sangat merugikan penghidupan Rakjat pekerdja, serta kedudukan negara dan Revolusi Nasional kita. Ini semua hanja mengunfungkan beberapa orang burdjuis komprador jang dengan terang2an menundjukkan sikap anti-nasional,

d.         Politik dilapangan agraria jang reaksioner dan antjaman terhadap kaum tani jang sudah sedar akan rol dan kewadjibannja sebagai tenaga jang penting dalam pelaksanaan Revolusi Nasional dan karenanja telah bergerak menghilangkan segala sisa feodalisme dilapangan agraria.

e.         Perintah untuk mendaftar nama2 dan mengamat-amati tindakan2 pemimpin2 Rakjat pekerdja. Teranglah, bahwa tindakan pemerin-tah jang reaksioner itu, jang bermaksud mempertahankan kedudu-kannja dan menguntungkan beberapa kelompok kaum burdjuis, tidak boleh tidak tentu makin meruntjingkan pertentangan antara Rakjat pekerdja dan pemerintah. Djadi bukannja kaum buruh jang meruntjingkan pertentangan klas, melainkan kaum burdjuis sendiri.

Sudah mendjadi kewadjiban kaum Komunis untuk menjedarkan Rakjat pekerdja dan kaum progresif terhadap berkembangnja politik reaksioner jang berbahaja dari pemerintah jang achimja pasti akan mendjerumuskan Revolusi Nasional kita kedjurang kegagalan dan kemusnahan. Dengan demikian dimaksudkan supaja tenaga massa Rakjat pekerdja bersama dengan tenaga progresif lainnja dapat merubah haluan politik pemerintah jang tidak sehat dan berbahaja itu kearah djurusan jang sehat. Walaupun kaum Komunis sekarang telah mendapat pengaruh lebih besar daripada diwaktu sebelum meninggalkan pemerintah, akan tetapi oleh karena tidak tahu tentang kesalahannja jang pokok dalam lapangan politik, maka sikap sebagian besar daripada Rakjat terhadap Komunisme djuga masih belum tjukup terang dan tegas.

Berhubung dengan itu, rapat Polit-Biro menetapkan, bahwa PKI dalam susunan jang baru dengan tegas harus membatalkan persetudjuan Linggadjati dan Renville, jang dalam prakteknja telah mendjadi sumber daripada bermatjam-matjam keruwetan diantara pemimpin2 dan Rakjat djelata. Hapusnja persetudjuan Linggadjati dan Renville berarti bahwa Republik Indonesia merdeka sepenuhnja dan Rakjat tidak terikat lagi oleh persetudjuan2 jang mengikat dan memperbudak. Dengan demikian Rakjat didaerah pendudukan akan mendapat kemerdekaan luas untuk beraksi terhadap Belanda. Hapusnja persetudjuan Linggadjati dan Renville berarti djuga, bahwa orang Indonesia boleh menganggap adanja kekuasaan Belanda di Indonesia sebagai pelanggaran kedaulatan Republik jang merdeka, dan oleh karena itu tentara Belanda harus diusir se-lekas2nja. Hapusnja persetudjuan Linggadjati dan Renville menghilangkan segala kebimbangan dikalangan beberapa partai lain untuk memperluas dan meneguhkan hubungan Republik dengan negeri2 asing. Dengan demikian Republik djuga mendapat kesempatan untuk menerobos blokade Belanda jang mengisolasi Republik dari negeri2 luar dalam lapangan ekonomi dan politik.

Kaum Komunis menolak persetudjuan Linggadjati dan Renville, bukannja karena Belanda terbukti tidak setia dan telah mengindjak-indjak persetudjuan itu. Tidak ! Sekali-kali tidak ! Komunis prinsipiil menolak persetudjuan Linggadjati dan Renville, oleh karena persetudjuan-persetudjuan itu djikalau dipraktekkan, akan mewudjudkan negara jang pada hakekatnja sama sadja dengan djadjahan, jang berbeda dengan India, Birma, Filipina dan djadjahan lain2 hanjalah kulitnja sadja. Sebab itu PKI tetap bersembojan: "Merdeka se-penuh2nja". Penolakan persetudjuan Linggadjati dan Renville berarti djuga selfkritik jang keras dikalangan PKI. Dan pengakuan salah ini harus dipopulerkan djuga kepada Rakjat-banjak.

PKI menolak perundingan dengan Belanda jang tidak didasarkan atas hak jang sama. Komunis prinsipiil tidak menolak perundingan, akan tetapi harus didasarkan atas hak2 jang sungguh-sungguh sama. Dalam perundingan se-kali2 tidak boleh disinggung soal kedaulatan Republik atas seluruh Indonesia.

Dalam perundingan2 inj PKI sanggup memberikan sekedar kondisi dilapangan ekonomi dan kebudajaan kepada orang2 Belanda jang tidak menentang Revolusi kita, lebih daripada jang sekarang biasa diberikan di-negeri2 kapitalis. Dalam politiknja terhadap Soviet Uni PKI mengandjurkan se-bulat2 nja supaja diadakan perhubungan langsung antara Republik Indonesia dengan Soviet Uni dalam segala lapangan. Soviet Uni adalah sekutu jang semestinja dari Rakjat Indonesia jang melawan imperialisme oleh karena Soviet Uni memelopori perdjuangan melawan blok imperialis jang dipimpin oleh Amerika Serikat. Tjukup djelas bagi kita bahwa Amerika Serikat membantu dan mempergunakan Belanda untuk mentjekek Republik kita jang demokratis. PKI harus menerangkan kepada Rakjat-banjak, bahwa pengakuan Soviet Uni membawa kebaikan semata-mata, sebab Soviet Uni sebagai negara kaum buruh tidak mungkin bersifat lain daripada anti-imperialis. Dengan demikian Soviet Uni tidak mempunjai kepentingan lain terhadap Indonesia ketjuali membantu Indonesia dalam perdjuangannja jang djuga bersifat anti-imperialis.

Dalam perdjuangannja melawan irnperialisme, PKI harus menghubungkan diri dengan gerakan2 anti-imperialis di Asia, di Eropa dan di Amerika, terutama sekali dengan Rakjat negeri Belanda jang progresif, jang sebagian besar dari mereka dipimpin oleh CPN. Partai ini walaupun sudah membuat kesalahan2, adalah satu-satunja Partai klas buruh dinegeri Belanda jang sungguh2 membantu gerakan keinerdekaan kita pada waktu sebelum dan sesudah peperangan dunia kedua. CPN adalah djuga mendjadi sekutu kita jang semestinja, dan perhubungan kita dengan CPN harus lebih dikokohkan lagi. Lain daripada itu PKI harus terus-menerus mendesak CPN supaja benar2 meninggalkan politik jang bersembojan : "Unie-verband" jang djahat itu dan menggantinja dengan politik "INDONESIA MERDEKA SEPENUH-PENUHNJA". Tudjuan PKI jalah mendirikan Republik Indonesia berdasarkan Demokrasi Rakjat, jang meliputi seluruh daerah Indonesia dan jang bebas dari pengaruh imperialisme serta tentaranja.

Politik Dalam negeri

Soal jang penting jalah, bahwa PKI dengan semua djalan harus menghalangi pemerintah sekarang ini djangan sampai terus-menerus memberi konsesi kepada imperialisme karena ini berarti menjerahkan Republik kedalam tangan imperialisme. Lagi pula dalam pekerdjaannja sehari-hari PKI harus dengan giat membela kepentingan2 kaum buruh dan kaum tani. Selandjutnja PKI harus djuga berusaha, se-lekas2nja melikwidasi segala kelemahan Revolusi kita. Kelemahan itu jalah :

1,         Klas buruh dengan pelopornja, jaitu PKI, belum memegang hegemoni daripada pimpinan Revolusi Nasional kita. Untuk mewudjudkan hegemoni ini dengan tegas dan teguh, maka perlu sekali dipenuhi siarat2 jang penting, jaitu adanja organisasi Partai jang rapi dan kuat jang meliputi tiap2 pabrik, perusahaan, bengkel, kantor, kampung dan desa, dengan anggota dan kader2 bagian jang sebagian besar terdiri dari kaum, buruh dan tani-pekerdja. Selandjutnja djuga adanja organisasi2 massa jang kuat jang meliputi sebagian besar daripada Rakjat pekerdja dari berbagai golongan, terutama dari kalangan kaum buruh dan tani, sedangkan Pimpinannja harus ditangan Partai.

2.         Pimpinan Revolusi Nasional kita, walaupun hegemoninja harus ada ditangan klas buruh, harus diwudjudkan oleh PKI ber-sama2 dengan partai2 atau elemen2 lain jang progresif berdasarkan sebuah program nasional jang revolusioner, jang disetudjui oleh bagian terbesar daripada Rakjat kita. Dengan demikian dapat terbentuk suatu pimpinan revolusi jang seia-sekata dan jang erat bekerdja bersama dengan dan disokong oleh seluruh Rakjat atau se-tidak2nja oleh sebagian terbesar daripadanja. Hingga sekarang hal ini belum tertjapai.

3.         Hingga sekarang Revolusi Nasional kita belum melandasi alat2 kekuasaan negara jang lama, jang djiwa, susunan ataupun tjara bekerdjanja masih sangat berbau pendjadjahan. Dalam hal ini PKI tidak boleh melupakan peladjaran Marx jang mengatakan, bahwa kewadjiban tiap revolusi jalah menghantjurkan alat kekuasaan negara jang lama dan menjusun alat kekuasaan negara jang baru. Dengan demikian dapatlah ditjegah usaha musuh untuk merebut kembali kekuasaan negara. Revolusi kita dengan melalaikan kewadjiban ini teiah membahajakan nasibnja sendiri. Oleh karena itu mendjadi kewajjiban jang penting bagi PKI dan semua tenaga progresif untuk selekas-Iekasnja memperbaiki kesalahan jang besar ini. Alat2 kekuasaan negara jang dengan segera harus dirubah dan disusun kembali ialah :

a. Pemerintahan dalamnegeri

Hingga sekarang alat ini boleh dibilang masih hampir samasekali alat lama jang bersifat feodal-kolonial, baik dalam susunan maupun dalam tjara bekerdjanja. Pun orang2nja sebagian besar adalah orang2 lama. Harus segera diusahakan agar supaja susunan pemerintahan desa sampai kabupaten dirubah samasekali setjara radikal, berdasarkan pemerintahan kolegial (kedewanan) jang dipilih langsung oleh Rakjat. Jang penting terutama jalah pemerintahan desa, agar Rakjat tani segera dapat dibebaskan dari belenggu2 feodalisme jang hingga sekarang masih mengikatnja. Perabahan ini harus dilaksaidakan dalam tempo jang se-singkat2 nja. Dengan sendirinia anasir2 jang reaksioner dan kontra-revolusioner harus segera disingkirkan dari kalangan pemerintahan dalam negeri.

b. Kepolisian Negara

Baik anggota2 maupun kader2nja harus diberi pendidikan jang sesuai dengan arti dan isi Revolusi Nasional kita dan kewadjiban kepolisian negara sekarang, jalah membela kepentingan Revolusi Nasional, jang berarti djuga membela kepentingan Rakjat pekerdja chususnja. Djadi kewadjiban mereka sekarang adalah bertentangan samasekali dengan kewadjiban mereka dahulu dizaman pendjadjahan. Terang, bahwa bagi anasir2 jang reaksioner atau kontra-revolusioner tidak ada tempat lagi didalam kepolisian negara. Kepolisian harus dipimpin oleh kader2 jang progresif.

c. Pengadilan negeri

Tjara bekerdjanja pengadilan negeri. harus tidak lagi setjara lama, jang hingga sekarang masih berlaku, melainkan harus dirubah dan didasarkan atas kepentingan Revolusi Nasional kita. Terutama jang mengenai perkara2 politik. Anasir2 jang reaksioner dan kontra-revolusioner harus segera disingkirkan dari aparat ini.

d. Ketentaraan

'I'entara sebagai alat kekuasaan negara jang terpenting harus istimewa mendapat perhatian. Kader2 dan ang gota2nja harus diberi pendidikan istimewa jang sesuai dengan kewadjiban tentara sebagai aparat terpenting untuk membela Revolusi Nasional kita, jang berarti pula membela kepentin-an Rakjat pekerdja. Tentara harus bersatu dengan dan disukai oleh Rakjat. Tentara harus dipimpin oieh kader2 jang progresif... Dengan sendirinja dan terutama dikalangan kader2nja harus dibersihkan dari anasir2 jang reaksioner dan kontra-revolusioner.

e. Alat2 negara lainnja jana penting2 seperti djawatan2 jang mengurus keuangan negara, alat2 produksi dan distribusi, pada umumnja harus dibersih-kan dari anasir2jang reaksioner dan kontra-revolusioner, terutama dalam pimpinannja, agar supaja kepentingan negara dan Rakjat dapat terdjamin.

4.         Kelalaian memberikan djaminan kepada anggota-anggota ketentaraan dan kepolisian negara chususnja, dan kepada Rakjat pekerdja umumnja (buruh dan pegawai negeri), hingga menjebabkan terlantarnja nasib mereka ini. PKI harus memperdjuangkan se-lekas2nja tertjapainja djaminan sekurang-kurangnja keperluan hidup se-hari2 bagi Rakjat pekerdja tersebut diatas.

Selain itu harus diperdjuangkan pula segera terlaksananja :

a.         bagi kaum buruh : hak2 demokrasi disegala lapangan, oleh karena mereka sebagai pelopor revolusi harus terutama diberi keuntungan banjak.

b.         bagi kaum tani : hapusnja sisa2 peraturan zaman feodal dan peraturan2 imperialis dilapangan pertanian, jang bagi Rakjat tani merupakan rintangan hebat untuk mendapat perbaikan nasib. Adapun politik PKI untuk kaum tani diseluruh Indonesia jalah : "Tanah untuk kaum tani". Djadi tiap orang tani harus diberi tanah, supaja ia merasakan benar2 buah revolusi. Akan tetapi kaum Komunis harus ingat, bahwa sekarang dan dalam beberapa tahun jang akan datang belum mungkin melaksanakan sembojan ini, berhubung dengan kurangnja luas tanah di Djawa dan Madura, sedangkan djumlah kaum tani terlampau besar. Oleh karena itu buat sementara waktu, Rakjat tani dapat diberi pertolongan jang lebih baik tidak dengan membagi-bagikan kepada mereka tanah2 jang dapat dibagikan kepadanja sebagai hasil penghapusan sisa2 peraturan feodal dilapangan agraria. Tetapi tanah ini diserahkan kepada desa dan desalah jang mengatur penggarapannja oleh buruh-tani dengan tjara jang menguntungkan mereka.

c,         Bagi pekerdja intelektuil: penghargaan jang lajak oleh pemerintah, sebab banjak pekerdja intelektuil jang merasa diri dan pekerdjaan-nja samasekali tidak dihargai oleh pemerintah.

1.         Kelalaian dalam memperluas alat2 produksi jang lama dan membangun alat2 produksi jang baru jang dikuasai negara serta mengerdjakannja dengan se-hebat2nja untuk mempertinggi kemakmuran Rakjat.

2.         Kelalaian dalam mengadakan aparat distribusi negara jang baik jang dapat memenuhi kewadjibannja dengan beres.

3.         Kelalaian dilapangan keuangan negara jang ternjata dengan rnemuntjaknja kesukaran2 tentang hal uang, jang betul2 dirasai oleh seluruh masjarakat, terutama dikalangan Rakjat pekerdja.

4.         Kelalaian dalam membangun koperasi2 Rakjat, tentang koperasi dilapangan keradjinan tangan dan perusahaan ketjil, dilapangan kredit dan distribusi jang dapat bekerdja bersama dengan pemerintah, baik dalam usaha pengumpulan bahan2 makanan, maupun dalam usaha distribusi barang2 dari pemerintah.

5.         Kelalaian dilapangan sosial, jaitu terutama jang mengenai pemberian pertolongan kepada tentara jang berhidjrah, pengungsi, djuga jang mengenai perumahan jang lajak bagi kaum buruh, perawatan kesehatan dan pemberian obat kepada Rakjat.

6.         Tidak adanja perhatian samasekali dari fihak pemerintah kepada masaalah golongan minoritet, jang sebagian besar terdiri dari orang2 jang memiliki perusahaan2 ketjil dan dari orang2 intelektuil. Harus diperdjuangkan oleh PKI supaja segala kelemahan ini dengan se-lekas2 nja dapat diatasi. Jang mengenai hal produksi dilapangan industri harus diandjurkan kepada kaum buruh, bahwa produksi harus diperbesar se-banjak2nja dengan sjarat, bahwa peroduksi dan distribusi serta perdagangan barang2 milik negara harus diawasi oleh serikatburuh.

Dengan pendek dapat dikatakan, bahwa dalam pekerdjaan se-hari2 PKI harus membela dengan giat kepentingan2 Rakjat pekerdja umumnja. Kepada pemerintah harus dituntut dengan tegas oleh PKI, supaja sebab2 jang dapat menimbulkan pemogokan segera dihilangkan.

Dalam menetapkan kewadjiban tersebut diatas, ditambah dengan kewadjiban melawan imperialisme jang mana sadja dengan tjara jang se-hebat2nja, maka kaum Komunis se-kali2 tidak boleh melupakan bahwa kewadjiban PKI pada saat ini dalam tingkatan revolusi sekarang ini jalah tidak melebihi daripada penjelesaian REVOLUSI NASIONAL atau REVOLUSI DEMOKRASI BURDJUIS TYPE BARU, sebagai tingkatan persediaan untuk revolusi jang lebih tinggi jaitu Revolusi Sosialis atau Revolusi Proletar.

Pendorong Revolusi Nasional sekarang ini jalah Rakjat progresif dan anti-imperialis seluruhnja terutama sekali klas buruh sebagai pemimpinnja dan kaum tani sebagai sekutu klas buruh jang terpenting. Djikalau diantara Rakjat progresif itu tidak ada persatuan, maka revolusi tidak akan menang! Sebaliknja, hanja persatuan jang kuat diantara seluruh Rakjat jang anti-imperialis itu akan membawa Revolusi kita kepada kemenangan.

Wudjud satu2nja daripada persatuan itu, jalah Front Nasional jang disusun dari bawah jang disokong oleh semua Partai dan golongan serta orang2 jang progresif.

III Front Nasional

Setelah menindjau riwajat gerakan kemerdekaan semendjak permulaan pendudukan negeri kita oleh Djepang hingga kini, maka Polit-Biro menetapkan dengan menjesal bahwa kaum Komunis telah lalai mengadakan Front Nasional sebagai sendjata Revolusi Nasional terhadap imperialisme. Walaupun kemudian mereka mulai sedar akan kepentingan Front Nasional itu, akan tetapi kaum Komunis belum faham sungguh2 tentang hakekat Front Persatuan Nasional dan tentang tjara membentuknja. Beberapa matjam bentuk Front Nasional selama tiga tahun ini telah didirikan, akan tetapi selalu tinggal diatas kertas belaka, bahwa hanja berupa konvensi diantara organisasi2 atau diantara pemimpin2 sadja, sehingga djikalau ada sedikit perselisihan diantara pemimpin2 Front Nasional itu lalu menjebabkan bubarnja.

PKI berkejakinan, bahwa pada saat ini Partai klas buruh tidak dapat menjelesaikan sendiri revolusi demokrasi burdjuis ini dan oleh karena itu PKI harus bekerdja bersama dengan partai2 lain. Kaum Komunis sudah semestinja berusaha mengadakan persatuan dengan anggota2 partai dan organisasi2 lain. Satu2nja persatuan sematjam itu jalah FRONT NASIONAL. Dalam menjusun ini PKI harus mengambil inisiatif dan dalam Front Nasional itu PKI harus djuga memainkan rol jang memimpin. Ini se-kali2 tidak berarti, bahwa kaum Komunis memaksa partai lain atau orang lain supaja mengikutinja, melainkan PKI harus mejakinkan dengan setjara sabar kepada orang2 jang tulus hati, bahwa satu2nja djalan untuk mendapat kemenangan jalah membentuk Front Nasional jang disokong oleh semua Rakjat jang progresif dan anti-imperialis. Tiap2 Komunis harus jakin benar2, bahwa dengan tidak adanja Front Nasional kemenangan tidak akan datang.

Oleh karena pada dewasa ini telah ada program nasional jang sudah disusun, disetudjui dan diterima pula oleh semua partai, maka tidak salah djika program nasional ini dipakai dengan segera sebagai dasar untuk mewudjudkan Front Nasional. Front Nasional jang tulen harus disusun dari bawah, semua anggota partai2 jang sudah menjetudjui Front Nasional seharusnja memasukinja, setjara individual. Selain daripada itu diberi djuga kesempatan kepada beribu orang jang tidak berpartai dan jang progresif turut serta dalam Front Nasional. Komite2 Front Nasional, baik didaerah maupun dipusat, harus dipilih setjara demokratis dari bawah. Front Nasional sematjam ini, sekali berdiri, tidak akan mudah hantjur, bahkan tidak terlalu bergantung lagi kepada kehendak pemimpin2 partai. Front Nasional sematjam itu memungkinkan djuga pengurangan perselisihan politik dan djuga memperketjil adanja oposisi sampai pada batas minimum.

Bersamaan dengan itu, PKI harus berdaja-upaja supaja pemerintah sekarang se-lekas2nja diganti dengan pemerintah FRONT NASIONAL jang berdasar atas program nasional dan jang, bertanggung djawab. Hanja pemerintah sematjam itulah jang akan berakar kuat dikalangan Rakjat dan sanggup mengatasi kesukaran2 dalamnegeri serta meneruskan perlawanan anti-imperialis setjara konsekwen.

IV  PKI dan daerah pendudukan

Polit-Biro menganggap perlu dan memutuskan, bahwa PKI harus sungguh2 mengatur dan memimpin perlawanan Rakjat terhadap Belanda didaerah pendudu-kan. Strategi PKI didaerah pendudukan terutama harus menghalangi Belanda dalam usahanja memperteguh kekuasaannja dan memperbesar produksinja. Kalau Belanda berhasil dalam usahanja itu, maka lambat laun Belanda dapat memadam-kan semangat perlawanan Rakjat djelata. Perlawanan jang selalu bertambah, jang dilakukan oleh kaum gerilja didaerah2 pendudukan di Djawa, di Sumatera dan di-pulau2 lain harus mendjadi tanda bagi semua Komunis untuk aktif dan berani menjokong dan memimpin perlawanan2 itu.

V  Ideologi

Polit-Biro berpendapat, bahwa kesalahan2 prinsipiil tsb. diatas terutama disebabkan karena lemahnja ideologi Partai. Kelemahan2 tsb. diatas harus Iekas diperbaiki. Dengan tidak adanja teori revolusioner tidak ada gerakan revolusioner kata Lenin. Pendapat Lenin ini terbukti kebenarannja dalam pekerdjaan kita. Oleh karena teori Marxisme-Leninisme adalah suatu ilmu (wetenschap) jang tertingi, maka iapun harus dipeladjari sebagai wetenschap djuga. Teori kita ini meneguhkan kejakinan, mena-djamkan kewaspadaan, membesarkan keberanian dan memudahkan pekerdjaan kita dalam keadaan jang sulit. Partai Komunis jang benar2 berdasar atas peladjaran2 MARX, ENGELS, LENIN dan STALIN tidak akan mudah djatuh dalam keadaan kebingungan, dan bagaimanapun djuga sulitnja keadaan dan suasana politik Partai Komunis selalu akan mendapat djalan jang tepat untuk mengatasinja. Berhubung dengan itu, mulai sekarang djuga tiap Komunis DIWADJIBKAN membatja dan mempeladjari setjara sistematis teori revolusioner dan diwadjibkan mengadakan kursus2 dikalangan kaum buruh dan kaum tani, agar supaja dengan djalan demikian mereka selalu dapat menghubungkan teori dan praktek dengan erat. Teori jang tidak dihubungkan dengan massa, tidak dapat merupakan kekuatan, akan tetapi sebalik-nja teori jang berhubungan erat dengan massa, merupakan kekuatan jang maha hebat.

Kawan Stalin mengatakan, bahwa tidak ada satu bentengpun djuga jang tidak dapat direbut oleh kaum Bolsjewik. Maka itu jakinlah, bahwa kaum Bolsjewik Indonesia akan dapat merebut benteng jang terantjam bahaja dihadapan mereka, jaitu benteng Indonesia Merdeka.

Polit-Biro Central Comite

Partai Komunis Indonesia

Djokjakarta, Agustus 1948.

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Historical Document

Self- Criticism by the Indonesian Communist Party, 1966

Starting in October 1965 and continuing into 1966, pro-U.S. fascist militarists unleashed a massacre of horrible proportions against the Indonesian people. Several hundred thousand Com munist Party of Indonesia (PKI) members and sympathizers as well as masses not involved in any political activity were murdered in cold blood. The number of people shot in the streets or arrested, tortured, and killed in prison is still not known with any accuracy. The massacre resulted in the crushing of the PKI, the fall of the Sukarno government, and the rise to power of a right-wing military clique led by Suharto which still holds sway in Indonesia today.

If the U.S. imperialists were not directly involved in Suharto's coup (and there is some evidence that they were), they openly applauded the fascist takeover in Indonesia. "We must say it's refreshing to read of young Moslems burning down Communist Party headquarters for a change and shouting 'Long Live America,"' said a Chicago Tribune editorial in October 1965. In July 1966, when the immensity of the bloodbath in Indonesia was already becoming clear, Time declared that the ousting of Sukarno was "the West's best news for years in Asia."

Sukarno had presided over a coalition government contained various forces, including the PKL Despite the nationalist rhetoric and some actions reflecting national bourgeois interests, Sukarno certainly did not stand for new democracy and genuine independence from imperialism. Under Sukarno, Indonesia, with its rich oil reserves and strategic position in Southeast Asia, remained under imperialist domination and was a prized neocolony for the U.S. But by the mid- '60s the U. S., neck deep in trouble in Vietnam, needed an outright lackey regime in place in Indonesia. The clique of right-wing generals under Suharto lit the bill to a tee.

The responsibility for the monstrous crime of several hundred thousand murders must be laid squarely at the doorsteps of the Indonesian reactionaries and their U.S. imperialist masters. At the same time, it's true that the PKI was extremely vulnerable to such an onslaught, and no effective, organized resistance to Suharto and the massacre was ever built. By the mid- '60s the core of the PKI leadership had become rotten with years of revisionism. The PKI put forward a wrong view of the state and in practice participated in and glorified Sukarno and the coalition government, which decidedly was not under proletarian leader- ship. The PKI also went down the revisionist path on the question of the process of revolution, seconding the thesis of a "peaceful road to socialism" advocated by the Soviet revisionists who came to power in 1956.

These and other serious errors were summarized and criticized in two documents by forces who were attempting a revolutionary regroupment of the PKI: 'Statement by the Political Bureau of the Central Committee of the Indonesian Communist Party" (August 17, 1966) and "Self-Criticism by the Political Bureau of the Central Committee of the Indonesian Communist Party" (september 1966). In 1968 China's Foreign Languages Press published a pamphlet, titled People of Indonesia, Unite and Fight to Overthrow the Fascist Regime. The pamphlet contained excerpts from the two documents as well as an editorial from Hongqi (Red Flag), magazine of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Panty. In this issue of Revolution we are reprinting large sections from this pamphlet.

What happened in Indonesia in the mid- '60s has many particularities relating to that country, to the specific array of class forces involved, and to that period of time. But the PKI summations are right to the point, for example, in emphasizing the importance of Mao Tsetung Thought. As the Declaration of the Revolutionary Internationalist Movement points out, "Without upholding and building on Marxism-Leninism-Mao Tsetung Thought it is not possible to defeat revisionism, imperialism and reaction in general." This and many other points made in the PKI summations are still very relevant today and warrant close study, including in relation to events in the world within the past year.

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January 1987

From: People of Indonesia, Unite and Fight to Overthrow the Fascist Regime

- Editorial of Hongqi (Red Flag), No.11, 1967 –

After staging the counter-revolutionary 1965 coup d'etat, the Suharto-Nasution Right-wing military clique, faithful lackey of U.S. imperialism and anti-communist ally of Soviet revisionism, established a fascist dictatorship of unprecedented ruthlessness in Indonesia. For the past year or more, it has followed an out-and-out traitorous, dictatorial, anti-communist, anti-China and anti- popular counter-revolutionary policy.

It has imposed a white terror in Indonesia on an unprecedented scale, slaughtered several hundred thousand Communists and revolutionary people and thrown into prison another several hundred thousand fine sons and daughters of the Indonesian people. All Indonesia has been turned into one vast hell. By engaging in bloody suppression, it attempts in vain to wipe out the Indonesian Communist party and stamp out the Indonesian revolution.

This clique cherishes an inveterate hatred for socialist China, which resolutely supports the revolutionary struggle of the Indonesian people. It has repeatedly carried out serious provocations against the Chinese people, whipped up anti-China, anti-Chinese campaigns and practised inhuman racist persecution against overseas Chinese. It has vainly tried to sabotage the traditional friendship between the Chinese people and the overseas Chinese in Indonesia on the one hand and the Indonesian people on the other, and to prevent the Chinese people from supporting the Indonesian people's revolution.

In the final analysis, the many kinds of persecution against the Indonesian Communist Party and the Indonesian people by the Suharto-Nasution Right-wing military clique will only serve to hasten the arrival of the upsurge in the Indonesian revolution and speed its own doom. The heroic Indonesian Communists and people can neither be cowed, suppressed, nor wiped out. The determination of the Indonesian people to make revolution is unshakable, so is the Chinese people's determination to support their revolution. No reactionary force on earth can obstruct this.

At present, the Indonesian Communists and revolutionary people are regrouping their forces for a new battle. The August 17, 1966 Statement of the Political Bureau of the Central Committee of the Indonesian Communist Party and the Self-Criticism it endorsed in September, which were published by the magazine Indonesian Tribune not long ago, are a call to the Indonesian Communists and the Indonesian working class, peasants, revolutionary intellectuals and all anti-imperialist, anti-feudal revolutionary forces to unite and engage in a new struggle.

The two documents of the Political Bureau of the Indonesian Communist Party are a telling blow at U.S. imperialism and its flunkeys, the Suharto-Nasution fascist military dictatorial regime, and the revisionist leading clique of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, and a tremendous encouragement to the revolutionary people of Indonesia. In these two documents, the Political Bureau of the Indonesian Communist Party sums up the experience and lessons of the Party in leading the Indonesian people's revolutionary struggle, criticizes the Right opportunist errors committed by the leadership of the Party in the past, points out the road for the Indonesian revolution, and lays down the principles for future struggle.

From: Statement by the Political Bureau of the Central Committee of the Indonesian Communist Party August 17, 1966

The Main Problem of Every Revolution Is The Problem of State Power

The statement declares that it is an absolute condition for every revolutionary, and even more so for every Communist, to grasp the truth that "the main problem of every revolution is the problem of state power".

The oppressed classes, in liberating themselves from exploitation and oppression, have no other way but to make a revolution, that is to say, overthrowing by force the oppressor classes from state power, or seizing state power by force. Because, the state is an instrument created by the ruling classes to oppress the ruled classes.

But, for a genuine people's revolution in the present modern era, it is not enough just to wrest the power from the hands of the oppressor classes, and to make use of the power that has been wrested. Marx has taught us that the destruction of the old military-bureaucratic state machine is "the prerequisite for every genuine people's revolution" (Lenin, State and Revolution). A genuine people's revolution will achieve decisive victory only after it has accomplished this prerequisite, while at the same time it sets up a completely new state apparatus whose task is to suppress by force and mercilessly the resistance put up by the overthrown oppressor classes.

What should the August Revolution of 1945 (1) have done with regard to the state power?

As a prerequisite, the August Revolution of 1945 should have smashed the colonial state machine along with all of its apparatuses that had been established to maintain colonial domination of Indonesia, and not merely transferred the power to the Republic of Indonesia. The August Revolution of 1945 should have established a completely new state, a state jointly ruled by all the anti-imperialist and anti-feudal classes under the leadership of the working class. This is what is to be called a people's democratic state.

The statement points out that due to the absence of the working class' leadership, the Republic of Indonesia was inevitably a state ruled by the bourgeoisie, despite the participation of the proletariat. A state with such a class character can never become an instrument of the 1945 August Revolution. Without the dictatorship of people's democracy, the August Revolution of 1945 did not have an instrument to defeat its enemies, and consequently was unable to accomplish its tasks, namely the complete liquidation of imperialist domination and the remnants of feudalism.

The Communists' voluntary withdrawal of a cabinet led by themselves in 1948 had opened up the broadest opportunity for the reactionary bourgeoisie led by Muhamad Hatta to make the state power fall into its hands. This reactionary bourgeoisie then betrayed the August Revolution by unleashing white terror, the Madiun affair, (2) as a prelude to the restoration of the Dutch imperialist interests through the conclusion of the despicable agreement of the round-table conference, which turned Indonesia into a semi-colonial and semi-feudal country.

The statement says that the resurgence of the revolutionary struggle of the Indonesian people in continuing the fight against the oppression by imperialism and the remnants of feudalism after the round-table conference, had gained certain political victories of partial and reform nature, which had led to the lessening of the anti-democratic character of the bourgeois power.

It was a great mistake to assume that the existence of such a government signified a fundamental change in the class character of the state power. It was equally incorrect to assume that the above-mentioned facts marked the birth and the development of an aspect representing the interests of the people, or of a pro-people aspect, within the state power. Such an error, that was formulated in the "theory of two aspects in state power", led to the conclusion that according to the before-mentioned facts, within the state power of the Republic of Indonesia there existed two aspects, the "anti-people aspect" consisting of comprador. bureaucrat capitalist and landlord classes on the one hand, and the 'pro-people aspect' composed mainly of the national bourgeoisie and the proletariat on the other hand.

According to this "two-aspect theory", a miracle could happen in Indonesia. namely that the state could cease to be an instrument of the ruling oppressor classes to subjugate other classes, but it could be made an instrument shared by both the oppressor classes and the oppressed classes. And the fundamental change in state power, that is to say, the birth of a people's power. could be peacefully accomplished by developing the "pro-people aspect" and gradually liquidating the "anti-people aspect".

The statement points out that hoping for a fundamental change in state power. to usher the people into the position of power, through the victory of the "pro-people aspect" over the "anti-people aspect" in line with the "theory of two aspects in state power". was but a pure illusion. The people will be able to gain power only through an armed revolution under the leadership of the working class to overthrow the power of the comprador bourgeoisie. the bureaucrat capitalists and the landlords which represent the interests of imperialism and the remnants of feudalism.

The "theory of two aspects in state power" has in practice deprived the proletariat of its independence in the united front with the national bourgeoisie, dissolved the interests of the proletariat in that of the national bourgeoisie. and placed the proletariat in a position as a tail-end of the national bourgeoisie.

To return the proletariat to its position of leadership in the liberation struggle of the Indonesian people, it is absolutely necessary to rectify the mistake of the "theory of two aspects in state power". and to do away with the erroneous view with regard to Marxist-Leninist teaching on state and revolution. The Road To a Completely Independent and Democratic New Indonesia. The statement indicates that the main contradiction in the present Indonesian society is still the same with what existed at the outbreak of the August Revolution of 1945, that is to say, imperialism and the remnants of feudalism are involved in a contradiction with the masses of the people who desire full independence and democracy.

Thus the target of the revolution remains the same: imperialism and the remnants of feudalism. Classes which are the enemies of the revolution. in the main, are also the same: imperialism. the compradors. the bureaucrat capitalists and the landlords. The driving forces of the revolution. too. are still the same: the working class. the peasantry and the petty bourgeoisie.

The statement says that after the imperialists no longer directly hold political power in Indonesia, their political interests are represented by the comprador bourgeoisie. the bureaucrat capitalists and the landlords who are holding the state power in their hands.

Therefore, only by overthrowing the power of the domestic reactionary classes can the overthrow of imperialism and the remnants of feudalism be concretely realized. This is the primary task of the present stage of the Indonesian revolution.

The statement points out that today. the Indonesian people are faced by the military dictatorship of the Right-wing army generals Suharto and Nasution and their accomplices. which is the manifestation of power of the most reactionary classes in our country.

The absence of democracy for the people, and the suppression by force of arms of every revolutionary and democratic movement, inevitably compel the whole people to take up arms in order to defend their rights. The armed struggle of the people against the armed counter-revolution is unavoidable and constitutes the chief form of struggle of the coming revolution. Only by taking the road of armed struggle. the Indonesian people will succeed in overthrowing the power of the armed counter-revolutionaries, as a pre- condition to realize their aspiration for which they have fought for scores of years: independence and freedom. The statement maintains that the armed struggle to defeat armed counter-revolution, as a revolution, must not be waged. in the form of military adventurism, in the form of a putsch, which is detached from the awakening of the popular masses.

The statement emphasizes that since the present stage of the Indonesian revolution is essentially an agrarian revolution by the peasantry, the armed struggle of the Indonesian people. too, essentially will be the armed struggle of the peasants to liberate themselves from the oppression by the remnants of feudalism. The armed struggle against the armed counter-revolution can never be lasting and in the end will surely be defeated, unless it is essentially an armed struggle of the peasants in realizing the agrarian revolution. And the armed struggle of the peasants to realize the agrarian revolution will only succeed in achieving a complete victory, and in really liberating the peasantry from the oppression by the remnants of feudalism. only when it is waged under the leadership of the proletariat, and when it is not limited to just overthrowing the power of the landlords in the countryside, but is aimed at smashing the entire power of the internal counter-revolutionaries who are now represented by the military dictatorship of the Right-wing army generals Suharto and Nasution and their accomplices.

From: Self-Criticism by the Political Bureau of the Central Committee of the Indonesian Communist Party September 1966

Indonesian Tribune published in its January issue (No.3) the self-criticism adopted by the Political Bureau of the Central Committee of the Indonesian Communist Party (P.K.I.) in September 1966. The self-criticism is entitled 'Build the P.K.I. Along the Marxist-Leninist Line to Lead the People's Democratic Revolution in Indonesia".

The self-criticism says that the disaster which has caused such serious losses to the P.K.I. and the revolutionary movement of the Indonesian people after the outbreak and the defeat of the September 30th Movement(3) has lifted up the curtain which for a long period has hidden the grave weaknesses of the P.K.I.

The Political Bureau is aware that it has the greatest responsibility with regard to the grave weaknesses and mistakes of the Party during the period under review. Therefore, the Political Bureau is giving serious attention to and highly appreciates all criticisms from cadres and members of the Party given in a Marxist-Leninist spirit, as well as honest criticism from Party sympathizers that have been expressed in different ways. The Political Bureau is resolved to make self-criticism in a Marxist-Leninist way, putting into practice the teaching of Lenin and the example of Comrade Musso in unfolding Marxist-Leninist criticism and self-criticism.

The self-criticism says that under the situation where the most vicious and cruel white terror is being unleashed by the military dictatorship of the Right-wing army generals Nasution and Suharto, it is not easy to make as complete criticism and self-criticism as possible. To meet the urgent necessity, it is necessary to point out the main issues in the ideological, political and organizational fields, in order to facilitate the study of the weaknesses and mistakes of the Party during the current rectification movement.

With all modesty and sincerity the Political Bureau presents this self-criticism. The Political Bureau expects all members to take an active part in the discussions of the weaknesses and mistakes of the Party leadership, critically analyse them, and do their utmost to improve this self- criticism of the Political Bureau by drawing lessons from their respective experiences, collectively or individually. The Political Bureau expects all members to take firm hold of the principle: "unity - criticism - unity" and "learning from past mistakes to avoid future ones, and curing the sickness to save the patient, in order to achieve the twofold objective of clarity in ideology and unity among comrades".(4) The Political Bureau is convinced that, by holding firmly to this correct principle, every Party member will take part in the movement to study and surmount these weaknesses and mistakes with the determination to rebuild the P.K.I. along the Marxist-Leninist line, to strengthen communist unity and solidarity, to raise the ideological, political and organizational vigilance, and to heighten the fighting spirit in order to win victory.

The Main Weaknesses in the Ideological Field

The serious weaknesses and mistakes of the Party in the period after 1951, the self-criticism says, certainly had as their source the weaknesses in ideological field, too, especially among the Party leadership. Instead of integrating revolutionary theories with the concrete practice of the Indonesian revolution, the Party leadership adopted the road which was divorced from the guidance of the most advanced theories. This experience shows that the P.K.I. had not succeeded as yet in establishing a core of leadership that was composed of proletarian elements, which really had the most correct understanding of Marxism-Leninism, systematic and not fragmentary, practical and not abstract understanding.

During the period after 1951, subjectivism continued to grow, gradually became greater and greater and gave rise to Right opportunism that merged with the influence of modern revisionism in the international communist movement. This was the black line of Right opportunism which became the main feature of the mistakes committed by the P.K.l. in this period. The rise and the development of these weaknesses and errors were caused by the following factors: First, the tradition of criticism and self-criticism in a Marxist-Leninist way was not developed in the Party, especially among the Party leadership.

The rectification and study movements which from time to time were organized in the Party were not carried out seriously and persistently, their results were not summed up in a good manner, and they were not followed by the appropriate measures in the organizational field. Study movements were aimed more at the rank and file, and never at unfolding criticism and self-criticisms among the leader- ship. Criticism from below far from being carefully listened to, was even suppressed.

Second, the penetration of the bourgeois ideology along two channels, through contacts with the national bourgeoisie when the Party established a united front with them, and through the bourgeoisification of Party cadres, especially the leadership, after the Party obtained certain positions in governmental and semi-governmental institutions. The increasing number of Party cadres who occupied certain positions in governmental and semi-governmental institutions in the centre and in the regions, created ''the rank of bourgeoisified workers" and this constituted "the real channels for reformism". (5) Such a situation did not exist before the August Revolution of 1945.

Third, modern revisionism began to penetrate into our Party when the Fourth Plenary Session of the Central Committee of the Fifth Congress uncritically approved a report which supported the lines of the 20th Congress of the C.P.S.U., and adopted the line of "achieving socialism peacefully through parliamentary means as the line of the P.K.I. This "peaceful road", one of the characteristics of modern revisionism, was further reaffirmed in the Sixth National Congress of the P.K.I. which approved the following passage in the Party Constitution: "There is a possibility that a people's democratic system as a transitional stage to socialism in Indonesia can be achieved by peaceful means, in parliamentary way. The P.K.I. persistently strives to transform this possibility into a reality." This revisionist line was further emphasized in the Seventh National Congress of the P.K.I. and was never corrected, not even when our Party was already aware that since the 20th Congress of the C.P.S.U., the leadership of the C.P.S.U. had been following the road of modern revisionism.

The self-criticism stresses that the experience of the P.K.I. provides the lesson that by criticizing the modern revisionism of the C.P.S.U. leadership alone, it does not mean that the P.K.I. itself will automatically be free from errors of Right opportunism, the same as what the modern revisionists are doing. The experience of the P.K.I. provides the lesson that modern revisionism, the greatest danger in the international communist movement, is also the greatest danger for the P.K.I. For the P.K.I., modern revisionism is not "a latent but not an acute danger", but a concrete danger that has brought great damage to the Party and serious losses for the revolutionary movement of the Indonesian people. Therefore, we must not in any way underestimate the danger of modern revisionism and must wage a resolute and ruthless struggle against it. The firm stand against modern revisionism in all fields can be effectively maintained only when our Party abandons the line of "preserving friendship with the modern revisionists".

It is a fact that the P.K.I., while criticizing the modern revisionism of the C.P.S.U. leadership, also made revisionist mistakes itself, because it had revised Marxist-Leninist teachings on class struggle, state and revolution. Furthermore, the P.K.I. leadership not only did not wage a struggle in the theoretical field against other "revolutionary" political thoughts which could mislead the proletariat, as Lenin has taught us to do, but had voluntarily given concessions in the theoretical field. The P.K.l. leadership maintained that there was an identity between the three components of Marxism: materialist philosophy, political economy and scientific socialism, and the so-called "three components of Sukarno's teachings" - They wanted to make Marxism, which is the ideology of the working class, the property of the whole nation which includes the exploiting classes hostile to the working class.

The Main Errors in the Political Field

The self-criticism says that the mistakes of Right opportunism in the political field which are now under discussion include three problems: (1) the road to people's democracy in Indonesia, (2) the question of state power, and (3) the implementation of the policy of the national united front.

One of the fundamental differences and problems of disputes between Marxism-Leninism and modern revisionism lies precisely in the problem of choosing the road to socialism. Marxism-Leninism teaches that socialism can only be achieved through the road of proletarian revolution and that in the case of colonial or semi-colonial and semi-feudal countries like Indonesia, socialism can only be achieved by first completing the stage of the people's democratic revolution. On the contrary, revisionism dreams of achieving socialism through the "peaceful road".

During the initial years of this period since 1951, our Party had achieved certain results in the political struggle as well as in the building of the Party. One important achievement of this period was the formulation of the main problems of the Indonesian revolution. It was formulated that the present stage of the Indonesian revolution was a new-type bourgeois democratic revolution, whose tasks were to liquidate imperialism and the vestiges of feudalism and to establish a people's democratic system as a transitional stage to socialism. The driving forces of the revolution were the working class, the peasantry and the petty bourgeoisie: the leading force of the revolution was the working class and the principal mass strength of the revolution was the peasantry. It was also formulated that the national bourgeoisie was a wavering force of the revolution who might side with the revolution to certain limits and at certain periods but who, at other times, might betray the revolution. The Party furthermore formulated that the working class in order to fulfil its obligation as the leader of the revolution, must forge a revolutionary united front with other revolutionary classes and groups based on worker-peasant alliance and under the leadership of the working class.

However, there was a very important shortcoming which in later days developed into Right opportunism or revisionism, namely, that the Party had not yet come to the clearest unity of minds on the principal means and the main form of struggle of the Indonesian revolution.

The Chinese revolution, the self-criticism says, has provided the lesson concerning the main form of struggle of the revolution in colonial or semi-colonial and semi-feudal countries, namely, the people's armed struggle against the armed counter-revolution. In line with the essence of the revolution as an agrarian revolution, then the essence of the people's armed struggle is the armed struggle of the peasants in an agrarian revolution under the leadership of the working class. The practice of the Chinese revolution is first and foremost the application of Marxism-Leninism to the concrete conditions of China. At the same time, it has laid down the general law for the revolutions of the peoples in colonial or semi-colonial and semi-feudal countries.

To achieve its complete victory, it stresses, the Indonesian revolution must also follow the road of the Chinese revolution. This means that the Indonesian revolution must inevitably adopt this main form of struggle, namely, the people's armed struggle against the armed counter-revolution which, in essence, is the armed agrarian revolution of the peasants under the leadership of the proletariat. All forms of legal and parliamentary work should serve the principal means and the main form of struggle, and must not in any way impede the process of the ripening of armed struggle.

The experience during the last fifteen years has taught us that starting from not explicitly denying the "peaceful road" and not firmly holding to the general law of revolution in colonial or semi-colonial and semi-feudal countries, the P.K.I. gradually got bogged down in parliamentary and other forms of legal struggle. The Party leadership even considered this to he the main form of struggle to achieve the strategic aim of the Indonesian revolution. The legality of the Party was not considered as one method of struggle at a given time and under certain conditions, but was rather regarded as a principle, while other forms of struggle should serve this principle. Even when counter-revolution not only has trampled underfoot the legality of the Party, but has violated the basic human rights of the Communists as well, the Party leadership still tried to defend this "legality" with all their might. The "peaceful road" was firmly established in the Party when the Fourth Plenary Session of the Central Committee of the Fifth Congress in 1956 adopted a document which approved the modern revisionist line of the 20th Congress of the C.P.S.U. In such a situation, when the revisionist line was already firmly established in the Party, it was impossible to have a correct Marxist-Leninist line of strategy and tactics. The formulation of the main lines of strategy and tactics of the Party started from a vacillation between the "peaceful road" and the "road of armed revolution", in the process of which the "peaceful road" finally became dominant.

Under such conditions, the General Line of the P.K.I. was formulated by the Sixth National Congress (1959). It reads, "To continue the forging of the national united front, and to continue the building of the Party, so as to accomplish the demands of the August Revolution of 1945." Based on the General Line of the Party, the slogan "Raise the Three Banners of the Party" was decided. These were: (1) the banner of the national united front, (2) the banner of the building of the Party, and (3) the banner of the 1945 August Revolution. The General Line was meant as the road to people's democracy in Indonesia.

The Party leadership tried to explain that the Three Banners of the Party were the three main weapons to win the people's democratic revolution which, as Comrade Mao Tsetung has said, were "a well-disciplined Party armed with the theory of Marxism-Leninism, using the method of self- criticism and linked with the masses of the people; an army under the leadership of such a Party: a united front of all revolutionary classes and all revolutionary groups under the leadership of such a Party" .(6)

Thus the second main weapon means that there must be a people's armed struggle against armed counterrevolution under the leadership of the Party. The Party leadership tried to replace this with the slogan "Raise the banner of the 1945 August Revolution".

In order to prove that the road followed was not the opportunist "peaceful road", the Party leadership always spoke of the two possibilities, the possibility of a "peaceful road" and the possibility of a non-peaceful road. They held that the better the Party prepared itself to face the possibility of a non-peaceful road, the greater would be the possibility of a "peaceful road". By doing so the Party leadership cultivated in the minds of Party members, the working class and the masses of the working people the hope for a peaceful road which in reality did not exist.

In practice, the Party leadership did not prepare the whole ranks of the Party, the working class and the masses of the people to face the possibility of a non-peaceful road. The most striking proof of it was the grave tragedy which happened after the outbreak and the failure of the September 30th Movement. Within a very short space of time, the counter-revolution succeeded in massacring and arresting hundreds of thousands of Communists and non-communist revolutionaries who found themselves in a passive position, paralysing the organization of the P.K.l. and the revolutionary mass organizations. Such a situation surely would never happen if the Party leadership did not deviate from the revolutionary road.

The Party leadership declared, says the self-criticism that "our Party must not copy the theory of armed struggle abroad, but must carry out the Method of Combining the Three Forms of Struggle: guerrilla warfare in the countryside (especially by farm labourers and poor peasants) revolutionary actions by the workers (especially transport workers) in cities, and intensive work among the enemy's armed forces". The Party leadership criticized some comrades who, in studying the experience of the armed struggle of the Chinese people. were considered seeing only its similarities with the conditions in Indonesia. On the contrary, the Party leadership put forward several allegedly different conditions that must be taken into account, until they arrived at the conclusion that the method typical to the Indonesian revolution was the "Method of Combining the Three Forms of Struggle". To fulfil its heavy but great and noble historical mission, to lead the people's revolution against imperialism, feudalism and bureaucrat-capitalism. the Indonesian Marxist-Leninists must firmly reject the revisionist "peaceful road", reject the "theory of the Method of Combining the Three Forms of Struggle" and hold aloft the banner of armed people's revolution. Following the example of the glorious Chinese revolution. the Indonesian Marxist- Leninists must establish revolutionary base areas; they must "turn the backward villages into advanced. consolidated base areas, into great military. political, economic and cultural bastions of the revolution".

While working for the realization of this most principal question we must also carry out other forms of struggle; armed struggle will never advance without being coordinated with other forms of struggle.

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The line of Right opportunism followed by the Party leadership was also reflected in their attitude with regard to the state, in particular to the state of the Republic of Indonesia, the self-criticism says.

Based on this Marxist-Leninist teaching on state, the task of the P.K.I., after the August Revolution of 1945 failed, should have been the education of the Indonesian working class and the rest of the working people, so as to make them understand as clearly as possible the class nature of the state of the Republic of Indonesia as a bourgeois dictatorship. The P.K.I. should have aroused the consciousness of the working class and the working people that their struggle for liberation would inevitably lead to the necessity of "superseding the bourgeois state" by the people's state under the leadership of the working class. through a "violent revolution". But the P.K.I. leadership took the opportunist line that gave rise to the illusion among the people about bourgeois democracy.

The self-criticism says that the climax of the deviation from Marxist-Leninist teaching on state committed by the Party leadership was the formulation of the "theory of the two aspects in the state power of the Republic of Indonesia".

The "two-aspect theory" viewed the state and the state power in the following way:

The state power of the Republic, viewed as contradiction. is a contradiction between two opposing aspects. This first aspect is the aspect which represents the interests of the people (manifested by the progressive stands and policies of President Sukarno that are supported by the P.K.I. and other groups of the people). The second aspect is the aspect that represents the enemies of the people (manifested by the stands and policies of the Right- wing forces and die-hards). The people's aspect has now become the main aspect and takes the leading role in the state power of the Republic

The "two-aspect theory" obviously is an opportunist or revisionist deviation, because it denies the Marxist-Leninist teaching that "the state is an organ of the rule of a definite class which cannot be reconciled with its antipode (the class opposite to it)".(7) It is unthinkable that the Republic of Indonesia can be jointly ruled by the people and the enemies of the people.

The self-criticism says that the Party leadership who wallowed in the mire of opportunism claimed that the "people's aspect" had become the main aspect and taken the hegemony in the state power of the Republic. It was as if the Indonesian people were nearing the birth of a people's power. And since they considered that the forces of the national bourgeoisie in the state power really constituted the "people's aspect", the Party leadership had done everything to defend and develop this "people's aspect". The Party leadership had altogether merged themselves in the interests of the national bourgeoisie. By considering the national bourgeoisie the "people's aspect" in the state power of the Republic, and President Sukarno the leader of this aspect, the Party leadership erroneously recognized that the national bourgeoisie was able to lead the new-type democratic revolution. This is contrary to historical necessity and historical facts. The Party leadership declared that the "two-aspect theory" was completely different from the "theory of structural reform" (8) of the leadership of the revisionist Italian Communist Party. However, the fact is, theoretically or on the basis of practical realities, there is no difference between the two "theories". Both have for their starting point the "peaceful road" to socialism. Both dream of a gradual change in the internal balance of forces in the state power. Both reject the road of revolution and both are revisionist.

The anti-revolutionary "two-aspect theory" glaringly exposed itself in the statement that "the struggle of the P.K.I. with regard to the state power is to promote the pro-people aspect so as to make it bigger and dominant, and the anti- people force can be driven out from the state power".

The Party leadership even had a name for this anti- revolutionary road; they called it the road of "revolution from above and below". By "revolution from above" they meant that the P.K.I. "must encourage the state power to take revolutionary steps aimed at making the desired changes in the personnel and in the state organs". While by "revolution from below" they meant that the P.K.I. "must arouse, organize and mobilize the people to achieve the same changes". It is indeed an extraordinary phantasy! The Party leadership did not learn from the fact that the concept of President Sukarno on the formation of a co-operation cabinet (the old-type government of national coalition), eight years after its announcement, had not been realized as yet. There was even no sign that it would ever be realized, despite the insistent demands. Let alone a change in the state power!

The self-criticism stresses that to clean itself from the mire of opportunism, our Party must discard this "theory of two-aspect in the state power" and re-establish the Marxist- Leninist teaching on state and revolution.

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The 5th National Congress of the Party in the main had solved theoretically the problem of the national united front. It formulated that the worker-peasant alliance was the basis of the national united front. With regard to the national bourgeoisie a lesson had been drawn on the basis of the experience during the August Revolution that this class had a wavering character. In a certain situation, the national bourgeoisie took part in the revolution and sided with the revolution, while in another situation they followed in the steps of the comprador-bourgeoisie to attack the driving forces of the revolution and betrayed the revolution (as shown by their activities during the Madiun Provocation and their approval of the Round Table Conference Agreement). Based on this wavering character of the national bourgeoisie, the Party formulated the stand that must be taken by the P.K.I., namely, to make continuous efforts to win the national bourgeoisie over to the side of revolution, while guarding against the possibility of its betraying the revolution. The P.K.I. must follow the policy of unity and struggle towards the national bourgeoisie, the self-criticism says.

Nevertheless, since the ideological weakness of subjectivism in the Party, particularly among the Party leadership, had not yet been eradicated, the Party was dragged into more and more serious mistakes, to such an extent that the Party lost its independence in the united front with the national bourgeoisie. This mistake had led to the situation in which the Party and the proletariat were placed as the appendage of the national bourgeoisie.

The self-criticism states that a manifestation of this loss of independence in the united front with the national bourgeoisie was the evaluation and the stand of the Party leadership towards Sukarno. The Party leadership did not adopt an independent attitude towards Sukarno. They had always avoided conflicts with Sukarno and, on the contrary, had greatly over-emphasized the similarities and the unity between the Party and Sukarno. The public saw that there was no policy of Sukarno that was not supported by the P.K.I. The Party leadership went so far as to accept without any struggle the recognition to Sukarno as "the great leader of the revolution" and the leader of the "people's aspect" in the state power of the Republic. In many articles and speeches, the Party leaders frequently said that the struggle of the P.K.I. was based not only on Marxism-Leninism, but also on "the teachings of Sukarno", that the P.K.I. made such a rapid progress because it realized Sukarno's idea of Nasakom unity,(9) etc. Even the concept of the people's democratic system in Indonesia was said to be in conformity with Sukarno's main ideas as expressed in his speech "The Birth of Pantjasila"(10) on June 1,1945.

The self-criticism repudiates the erroneous view that "to implement the Political Manifesto in a consistent manner is the same as implementing the programme of the P.K.I."

The statement that consistently implementing the Political Manifesto meant implementing the programme of the P.K.I. could only be interpreted that it was not the pro- gramme of the P.K.I. that was accepted by the bourgeoisie, but that, on the contrary, it was the programme of the national bourgeoisie which was accepted by the P.K.I., and was made to replace the programme of the P.K.I., it points out.

The self-criticism says that the abandonment of principle in the united front with the national bourgeoisie had developed even further in the so-called "General Line of the Indonesian Revolution" that was formulated as follows: "With the national united front having the workers and peasants as its pillars, the Nasakom as the core and the Pantjasila as its ideological basis, to complete the national democratic revolution in order to advance towards Indone- sian Socialism." This so-called "General Line of the Indone- sian Revolution" had not even the faintest smell of the revolution. Because, from the three preconditions to win the revolution, namely, a strong Marxist-Leninist Party, a peo- ple's armed struggle under the leadership of the Party, and a united front, only the united front was retained. Even then, it was not a revolutionary united front, because it was not led by the working class, nor was it based on the alliance of the working class and the peasantry under the leadership of the working class, but on the contrary it was based on the Nasakom.

The Party leadership said that "the slogan for national co-operation with the Nasakom as the core will by no means obscure the class content of the national united front". This statement is incorrect. The class content of the Nasakom was the working class, the national bourgeoisie, and even elements of the compradors, the bureaucrat-capitalists and the landlords. Obviously, putting the Nasakom in the core not only meant obscuring the class content of the national united front, but radically changing the meaning of the revolutionary national united front into an alliance of the working class with all other classes in the country, including the reactionary classes, into class collaboration. This error must be corrected. The Party must throw to the dust-bin the erroneous "General Line of the Indonesian Revolution" and return to the correct conception of a revolu- tionary national united front based on the alliance of the workers and peasants under the leadership of the working class.

The abandonment of principle in the united front with the national bourgeoisie was also the result of the Party's in- ability to make a correct and concrete analysis of the con- crete situation, the self-criticism says.

The self-criticism points out that ever since the failure of the August Revolution of 1945, except in West Irian, the im- perialists did not hold direct political power in Indonesia. In Indonesia, political power was in the hands of compradors and landlords who represented the interests of imperialism and the vestiges of feudalism. Besides, there was no im- perialist aggression in Indonesia taking place. Under such a situation, provided that the P.K.I. did not make political mistakes, the contradiction between the ruling reactionary classes and the people would develop and sharpen, constitut- ing the main contradiction in Indonesia. The primary task of the Indonesian revolution is the overthrow of the rule of the reactionary classes within the country who also represent the interests of the imperialists, in particular the United States imperialists. Only by taking this road can the real li- quidation of imperialism and the vestiges of feudalism be realized.

By correcting the mistakes made by the Party in the united front with the national bourgeoisie it does not mean that now the Party need not unite with this class. On the basis of the worker-peasant alliance under the leadership of the working class, our Party must work to win the national bourgeois class over to the side of the revolution.

The Main Mistakes in the organizational Field

The self-criticism says that the erroneous political line which dominated the Party was inevitably followed by an equally erroneous organizational line. The longer and the more intensive the wrong political line ruled in the Party, the greater were the mistakes in the organizational field, and the greater the losses caused by them. Right opportunism which constituted the wrong political line of the Party in the period after 1951 had been followed by another Right deviation in the organizational field, namely, liberalism and legalism.

The line of liberalism in the organizational field manifested itself in the tendency to make the P.K.I. a Party with as large a membership as possible, a Party with a loose organization, which was called a mass Party.

It says that the mass character of the Party is not deter- mined above all by the large membership, but primarily by the close ties linking the Party and the masses, by the Party's political line which defends the interests of the masses, or in other words by the implementation of the Party's mass line. And the mass line of the Party can only be maintained when the prerequisites determining the Party's role as the ad- vanced detachment are firmly upheld, when the Party members are made up of the best elements of the proletariat who are armed with Marxism-Leninism. Consequently, to build a Marxist-Leninist Party which has a mass character is impossible without giving primary importance to Marxist- Leninist education.

The self-criticism points out that during the last few years, the P.K.I. had carried out a line of Party building which deviated from the principles of Marxism-Leninism in the organizational field.

The self-criticism says that this liberal expansion of Party membership could not be separated from the political line of the "peaceful road". The large membership was intended to increase the influence of the Party in the united front with the national bourgeoisie. The idea was to effect the gradual change in the balance of forces that would make it possible to completely defeat the die-hard forces, with a Party that was growing bigger and bigger, in addition to the continued policy of unity with the national bourgeoisie.

The stress was no longer laid on the education and the training of Marxist-Leninist cadres to prepare them for the revolution, for work among the peasants in order to establish revolutionary bases, but on the education of intellectuals to serve the needs of the work in the united front with the na- tional bourgeoisie, and to supply cadres for the various posi- tions in the state institutions that were obtained thanks to the co-operation with the national bourgeoisie. The slogan of "total integration with the peasants" had become empty talk. What was being done in practice was to draw cadres from the countryside to the cities, from the regions to the centre, instead of sending the best cadres to work in the rural areas.

To raise the prestige of the P.K.I. in the eyes of the bourgeoisie, and to make it respected as the Party of intellec- tuals, the 4-Year Plan stipulated that all cadres of the higher ranks must obtain academic education, cadres of the middle ranks high school education, and cadres of the lower ranks lower middle school education. For this purpose the Party had set up a great number of academies, schools and courses. So deep-rooted was the intellectualism gripping the Party leadership that all Party leaders and prominent figures of the popular movements were obliged to write four theses in order to obtain the degree of "Marxist Scientists".

The deeper the Party was plunged into the mire of opportunism and revisionism, the greater it lacked organizational vigilance and the more extensively legalism developed in the organization. The Party leadership had lost its class prejudice towards the falsehood of bourgeois democracy. All the ac- tivities of the Party indicated as if the "peaceful road' was an inevitable certainty. The Party leadership did not arouse the vigilance of the masses of Party members to the danger of the attacks by the reactionaries who were constantly on the look for the chance to strike. Due to this legalism in the organiza- tional field, within a short span of time counter-revolution has succeeded in paralysing the P.K.I. organizationally.

Liberalism in organization had destroyed the principle of internal democracy in the Party, destroyed collective leader- ship and had given rise to personal leadership and personal rule, to autonomism.

In a situation when liberalism dominated the organiza- tional line of the Party, it was impossible to realize the Party's style of work "to combine theory and practice, to keep close bonds with the masses and to conduct self- criticism". It was equally impossible to realize the method of leadership whose essence is the unity of the leadership and the masses; to realize it the leadership must give an example to the rank-and-file.

The self-criticism points out that thus, in general the wrong political line which ruled in the Party was followed by the wrong line in the organizational field which violated the principles of a Marxist-Leninist Party, destroyed the organizational foundation of the Party, namely, democratic centralism, and trampled on the Party's style of work and method of leadership.

The self-criticism emphatically points out that to build the P.K.I. as a Marxist-Leninist Party, we must thoroughly uproot liberalism in the organizational field and its ideological source. The P.K.I. must be rebuilt as a Lenin-type Party, a Party that will be capable of fulfilling its role as the advanced detachment and the highest form of class organization of the Indonesian proletariat, a Party with a historical mission of leading the masses of the Indonesian people to win victory in the anti-imperialist, anti-feudal and anti- bureaucrat-capitalist revolution, and to advance towards socialism. Such a Party must fulfil the following conditions: Ideologically, it is armed with the theory of Marxism- Leninism, and free from subjectivism, opportunism and modern revisionism; politically, it has a correct programme which includes a revolu-tionnary agrarian programme, has a thorough understanding of the problems of the strategy and tactics of the Indonesian revolution, masters the main form of struggle, namely, the armed struggle of the peasants under the leadership of the proletariat, as well as other forms of struggle, is capable of establishing a revolutionnary united front of all anti-imperialist and anti-feudal classes based on the worker-peasant alliance under the leadership of the working class; organizationally, it is strong and has a deep root among the masses of the people, consists of trustworthy, experienced and steeled Party members who are models in the implementation of the national tasks.

Today, we are rebuilding our Party under the reign of counter-revolutionary white terror which is most cruel and ferocious. The legality of the Party and the basic human rights of the Communists have been wantonly violated. The Party, therefore, has to be organized and has to work in complete illegality. While working in complete illegality, the Party must be adept at utilizing to the full all possible opportunities to carry out legal activities according to circumstances, and to choose ways and means that are acceptable to the masses with the aim of mobilizing the masses for struggle and leading this struggle step by step to a higher stage.

The self-criticism stresses that in rebuilding the P.K.I. along the Marxist-Leninist line, the greatest attention should be devoted to the building of Party organizations in the rural areas, to the establishment of revolutionary bases.

The task to rebuild a Marxist-Leninist Party as has been stated above requires arduous and protracted work, and is full of danger, and consequently it must be carried out courageously, perseveringly, carefully, patiently and persistently.

The Way Out

The self-criticism says that once we know the weakness- es and mistakes of the Party during the period after 1951 as have been explained above, obviously what we have to do is to realize the most urgent tasks faced by the Indonesian Marxist-Leninists at the present time, the first one being the rebuilding of the P.K.I. as a Marxist-Leninist Party which is free from subjectivism, opportunism and modern revisionism.

To rebuild the P.K.I. as such a Marxist-Leninist Party, Party cadres of all levels and then all Party members must reach a unanimity of mind with regard to the mistakes made by the Party in the past, as well as concerning the new road that must be taken.

Subjectivism can be effectively combated and liquidated when the ability of the whole Party to distinguish proletarian ideology from the ideology of the petty bourgeoisie is raised, and when criticism and self-criticism is encouraged. To raise the ability of the whole Party to distinguish proletarian ideology from the ideology of the petty bourgeoisie will be possible only by intensifying the education of Marxism- Leninism. The Party must educate its members to apply the Marxist-Leninist method in analysing the political situation and in evaluating the forces of the existing classes, so that subjective analysis and evaluation can be avoided. The Party must draw the attention of the members to the importance of investigation and study of social and economic conditions, in order to be able to define the tactics of struggle and the corresponding method of work. The Party must help the members to understand that without an investigation of the actual conditions they will get bogged down in phantasy.

The self-criticism emphatically points out that the ex- perience of the struggle waged by the Party in the past has shown how indispensable it is for the Indonesian Marxist- Leninists, who are resolved to defend Marxism-Leninism and to combat modern revisionism, to study not only the teachings of Marx, Engels, Lenin and Stalin, but also to devote special attention to studying the Thought of Mao Tsetung who has succeeded in brilliantly inheriting, defending and developing Marxism-Leninism to its peak in the present era.

The P.K.I. will be able to hold aloft the banner of Marxism-Leninism, only when it takes a resolute stand in the struggle against modern revisionism which today is centred around the leading group of the C.P.S.U. The fight against modern revisionism cannot be consistently carried out while, at the same time, preserving friendship with the modern revisionists. The P.K.I. must abandon the wrong attitude it held in the past with regard to the question of the relations with the modern revisionists. Loyalty to proletarian internationalism can only be manifested by a merciless stand in the struggle against modern revisionism, because modern revisionism has destroyed proletarian internationalism, and betrayed the struggle of the proletariat and the oppressed people all over the world.

In rebuilding the Party, the Indonesian Marxist- Leninists must devote their attention to the creation of the conditions to lead the armed agrarian revolution to the peasants that will become the main form of struggle to win victory for the people's democratic revolution in Indonesia. This means that the greatest attention should be paid to the rebuilding of Party organizations in the rural areas. The greatest attention must be paid to the solution of the problem of arousing, organizing and mobilizing the peasants in an anti.feudal agrarian revolution. The integration of the Party with the peasants, in particular with farm labourers and poor peasants, must be conscientiously carried out. Because, only through such an integration will the Party be able to lead the peasantry, and the peasantry, for their part, will be capable of becoming the invincible bulwark of the people's democratic revolution.

As a result of the attacks of the third white terror, Party organizations in the rural areas in general have suffered greater damage. This fact has rendered it more difficult and arduous to work in the countryside. But this does not in any way change the inexorable law that the main force of the people's democratic revolution in Indonesia is the peasantry, and its base area is the countryside. With the most resolute determination that everything is for the masses of the people, the Indonesian Marxist-Leninists will certainly be able to overcome the gravest difficulties. By having the most whole- hearted faith in the masses and by relying on the masses, the Indonesian Marxist-Leninists will certainly be able to transform the backward Indonesian villages into great and consolidated military, political and cultural bastions of the revolution.

The Indonesian peasants are the most interested in the people's democratic revolution. Because, only this revolution will liberate them from the life of backward-ness and inequality as a result of feudal suppression. It is only this revolution that will give them what they have dreamt all their lives and which will give them life: land. That is why the peasants will surely take this road of revolution for land and liberation, no matter how arduous and full of twists and turns this road will be.

Obviously, the second task of the Indonesian Marxist- Leninists at present is the creation of the necessary conditions for the armed agrarian revolution of the peasants under the leadership of the proletariat. Provided that the Indone- sian Marxist-Leninists succeed in arousing, organizing and mobilizing the peasants to carry through an anti-feudal agrarian revolution, the leadership of the working class in the people's democratic revolution and the victory of this revolution are assured.

However, the Party must continue the efforts to establish a revolutionary united front with other anti-imperialist and anti-feudal classes and groups. Based on the alliance of the working class and the peasantry under the leadership of the proletariat, the Party must work to win over the urban petty bourgeoisie and other democratic forces, and must also work to win over the national bourgeoisie as an additional ally in the people's democratic revolution. The present objective conditions offer the possibility for the establishment of a broad revolutionary united front.

The military dictatorship of the Right-wing army generals Nasution and Suharto is the manifestation of the rule by the most reactionary classes in the country, namely, the comprador-bourgeoisie, the bureaucrat-capitalists and the landlords. The internal reactionary classes under the leadership of the clique of Right-wing army generals exercise dictatorship over the Indonesian people, and act as watch-dogs guarding the interests of imperialism, in particular United States imperialism, in Indonesia. Consequently, the coming into power of the military dictatorship of the Right-wing army generals will certainly serve to intensify the suppression and exploitation of the Indonesian people by imperialism and feudalism.

The military dictatorship of the Right-wing army generals represents the interests of only a very small minority who suppresses the overwhelming majority of the Indonesian people. That is why the military dictatorship of the Right- wing army generals will certainly meet with resistance from the broad masses of the people.

Thus, the third urgent task faced by the Indonesian Marxist-Leninists is to establish the revolutionary united front with all anti-imperialist and anti-feudal classes and groups based on the worker-peasant alliance under the leadership of the working class.

Thus, it has become clear that to win victory for the peo- ple's democratic revolution, the Indonesian Marxist- Leninists must hold aloft the Three Banners of the Party, namely:

The first banner, the building of a Marxist-Leninist Party which is free from subjectivism, opportunism and modern revisionism.

The second banner, the armed people's struggle which in essence is the armed struggle of the peasants in an anti-feudal agrarian revolution under the leadership of the working class.

The third banner, the revolutionary united front based on the worker-peasant alliance under the leadership of the working class.

The tasks forced by the Indonesian Marxist-Leninists are very arduous. They have to work under the most savage and barbarous terror and persecution which have no parallel in history. However, the Indonesian Marxist-Leninists do not have the slightest doubt that, by correcting the mistakes made by the Party in the past, they are now marching along the correct road, the road of people's democratic revolution. No matter how protracted, tortuous and full of difficulties, this is the only road leading to a free and democratic New Indonesia, an Indonesia that will really belong to the Indonesian people. For this noble cause, we must have the courage to traverse the long road.

The self-criticism points out that the Indonesian Marxist- leninists and revolutionaries on the basis of their own experience in struggle, do not have the slightest doubt about the correctness of Comrade Mao Tse-tung's thesis that at "the imperialists and all reactionaries are paper tigers. In appearance they are terrifying, but in reality they are not so powerful. From a long-term point of view, it is not the reactionaries but the people who are really powerf. The military dictatorship of the Right-wing army generals which is now in power is also a paper tiger. In appearance they are powerful and terrifying. But in reality they are not so powerful, because they are not supported but on the contrary are opposed by the people, because their ranks are beset by contradictions, and because they are quarrelling among themselves for a bigger share of their plunder and for greater power. The imperialists, in particular the United States imperialists who are the mainstay of the military dictatorship of the Right- wing army generals, are also paper tigers. In appearance they are powerful and terrifying, but in reality they are weak and nearing their complete downfall. The weakness of imperialism, in particular United States imperialism, is vividly demonstrated by their inability to conquer the heroic Vietnamese people and to check the tide of the anti-imperialist struggle waged by the people all over the world, including the American people themselves, who are furiously dealing blows at the fortresses of imperialism. From a strategic point of view, the imperialists and all reactionaries are weak, and consequently we must despise them. By despising the enemies strategically we can build up the courage to fight them and the confidence to defeat them. At the same time we must take them all seriously, take into full account of their strength tactically, and refrain from taking adventurist steps against them.

The Indonesian Marxist-Leninists will spare neither ef- forts nor energy to fulfil the best wishes of the world Marxist- Leninists by resolutely defending Marxism-I,eninism and struggling against modern revisionism, by working still better for the liberation of their people and country, and for the world proletarian revolution. The Indonesian Marxist-Leninists who are united in mind and determined to take the road of revolution, by putting their wholehearted faith in the people, by relying on the people, by working courageously, perseveringly, Conscientiously, patiently, persistently and vigilantly, will surely be able to accomplish their historical mission, to lead the people's democratic revolution, to smash the military dictatorship of the Right-wing army generals and to set up a completely new power, the people's democratic dictatorship. With the people's democratic dictatorship, the joint power of anti-imperialist and anti-feudal classes and groups under the leadership of the working class, the Indonesian people will completely liquidate imperialism and the vestiges of feudalism, build a free and democratic new society, and advance toward Socialism where the suppression and exploitation of man by man no longer exists. Let us unite closely to take the road of revolution which is illuminated by the teaching of Marxism-Leninism, the road leading to the liberation of the Indonesian people and proletariat, the road leading to Socialism.

was but a pure illusion. The people will be able to gain power only through an armed revolution under the leadership of the working class to overthrow the power of the comprador bourgeoisie. the bureaucrat capitalists and the landlords which represent the interests of imperialism and the remnants of feudalism.

The "theory of two aspects in state power" has in practice deprived the proletariat of its independence in the united front with the national bourgeoisie, dissolved the interests of the proletariat in that of the national bourgeoisie. and placed the proletariat in a position as a tail-end of the national bourgeoisie.

To return the proletariat to its position of leadership in the liberation struggle of the Indonesian people, it is absolutely necessary to rectify the mistake of the "theory of two aspects in state power". and to do away with the erroneous view with regard to Marxist-Leninist teaching on state and revolution. The Road To a Completely Independent and Democratic New Indonesia. The statement indicates that the main contradiction in the present Indonesian society is still the same with what existed at the outbreak of the August Revolution of 1945, that is to say, imperialism and the remnants of feudalism are involved in a contradiction with the masses of the people who desire full independence and democracy.

Thus the target of the revolution remains the same: imperialism and the remnants of feudalism. Classes which are the enemies of the revolution. in the main, are also the same: imperialism. the compradors. the bureaucrat capitalists and the landlords. The driving forces of the revolution. too. are still the same: the working class. the peasantry and the petty bourgeoisie.

The statement says that after the imperialists no longer directly hold political power in Indonesia, their political interests are represented by the comprador bourgeoisie. the bureaucrat capitalists and the landlords who are holding the state power in their hands.

Therefore, only by overthrowing the power of the domestic reactionary classes can the overthrow of imperialism and the remnants of feudalism be concretely realized. This is the primary task of the present stage of the Indonesian revolution.

The statement points out that today. the Indonesian people are faced by the military dictatorship of the Right-wing army generals Suharto and Nasution and their accomplices. which is the manifestation of power of the most reactionary classes in our country.

The absence of democracy for the people, and the suppression by force of arms of every revolutionary and democratic movement, inevitably compel the whole people to take up arms in order to defend their rights. The armed struggle of the people against the armed counter-revolution is unavoidable and constitutes the chief form of struggle of the coming revolution. Only by taking the road of armed struggle. the Indonesian people will succeed in overthrowing the power of the armed counter-revolutionaries, as a pre- condition to realize their aspiration for which they have fought for scores of years: independence and freedom. The statement maintains that the armed struggle to defeat armed counter-revolution, as a revolution, must not be waged. in the form of military adventurism, in the form of a putsch, which is detached from the awakening of the popular masses.

The statement emphasizes that since the present stage of the Indonesian revolution is essentially an agrarian revolution by the peasantry, the armed struggle of the Indonesian people. too, essentially will be the armed struggle of the peasants to liberate themselves from the oppression by the remnants of feudalism. The armed struggle against the armed counter-revolution can never be lasting and in the end will surely be defeated, unless it is essentially an armed struggle of the peasants in realizing the agrarian revolution. And the armed struggle of the peasants to realize the agrarian revolution will only succeed in achieving a complete victory, and in really liberating the peasantry from the oppression by the remnants of feudalism. only when it is waged under the leadership of the proletariat, and when it is not limited to just overthrowing the power of the landlords in the countryside, but is aimed at smashing the entire power of the internal counter-revolutionaries who are now represented by the military dictatorship of the Right-wing army generals Suharto and Nasution and their accomplices.

From: Self-Criticism by the Political Bureau of the Central Committee of the Indonesian Communist Party September 1966

Indonesian Tribune published in its January issue (No.3) the self-criticism adopted by the Political Bureau of the Central Committee of the Indonesian Communist Party (P.K.I.) in September 1966. The self-criticism is entitled 'Build the P.K.I. Along the Marxist-Leninist Line to Lead the People's Democratic Revolution in Indonesia".

The self-criticism says that the disaster which has caused such serious losses to the P.K.I. and the revolutionary movement of the Indonesian people after the outbreak and the defeat of the September 30th Movement(3) has lifted up the curtain which for a long period has hidden the grave weaknesses of the P.K.I.

The Political Bureau is aware that it has the greatest responsibility with regard to the grave weaknesses and mistakes of the Party during the period under review. Therefore, the Political Bureau is giving serious attention to and highly appreciates all criticisms from cadres and members of the Party given in a Marxist-Leninist spirit, as well as honest criticism from Party sympathizers that have been expressed in different ways. The Political Bureau is resolved to make self-criticism in a Marxist-Leninist way, putting into practice the teaching of Lenin and the example of Comrade Musso in unfolding Marxist-Leninist criticism and self-criticism.

The self-criticism says that under the situation where the most vicious and cruel white terror is being unleashed by the military dictatorship of the Right-wing army generals Nasution and Suharto, it is not easy to make as complete criticism and self-criticism as possible. To meet the urgent necessity, it is necessary to point out the main issues in the ideological, political and organizational fields, in order to facilitate the study of the weaknesses and mistakes of the Party during the current rectification movement.

With all modesty and sincerity the Political Bureau presents this self-criticism. The Political Bureau expects all members to take an active part in the discussions of the weaknesses and mistakes of the Party leadership, critically analyse them, and do their utmost to improve this self- criticism of the Political Bureau by drawing lessons from their respective experiences, collectively or individually. The Political Bureau expects all members to take firm hold of the principle: "unity - criticism - unity" and "learning from past mistakes to avoid future ones, and curing the sickness to save the patient, in order to achieve the twofold objective of clarity in ideology and unity among comrades".(4) The Political Bureau is convinced that, by holding firmly to this correct principle, every Party member will take part in the movement to study and surmount these weaknesses and mistakes with the determination to rebuild the P.K.I. along the Marxist-Leninist line, to strengthen communist unity and solidarity, to raise the ideological, political and organizational vigilance, and to heighten the fighting spirit in order to win victory.

The Main Weaknesses in the Ideological Field

The serious weaknesses and mistakes of the Party in the period after 1951, the self-criticism says, certainly had as their source the weaknesses in ideological field, too, especially among the Party leadership. Instead of integrating revolutionary theories with the concrete practice of the Indonesian revolution, the Party leadership adopted the road which was divorced from the guidance of the most advanced theories. This experience shows that the P.K.I. had not succeeded as yet in establishing a core of leadership that was composed of proletarian elements, which really had the most correct understanding of Marxism-Leninism, systematic and not fragmentary, practical and not abstract understanding.

During the period after 1951, subjectivism continued to grow, gradually became greater and greater and gave rise to Right opportunism that merged with the influence of modern revisionism in the international communist movement. This was the black line of Right opportunism which became the main feature of the mistakes committed by the P.K.l. in this period. The rise and the development of these weaknesses and errors were caused by the following factors: First, the tradition of criticism and self-criticism in a Marxist-Leninist way was not developed in the Party, especially among the Party leadership.

The rectification and study movements which from time to time were organized in the Party were not carried out seriously and persistently, their results were not summed up in a good manner, and they were not followed by the appropriate measures in the organizational field. Study movements were aimed more at the rank and file, and never at unfolding criticism and self-criticisms among the leader- ship. Criticism from below far from being carefully listened to, was even suppressed.

Second, the penetration of the bourgeois ideology along two channels, through contacts with the national bourgeoisie when the Party established a united front with them, and through the bourgeoisification of Party cadres, especially the leadership, after the Party obtained certain positions in governmental and semi-governmental institutions. The increasing number of Party cadres who occupied certain positions in governmental and semi-governmental institutions in the centre and in the regions, created ''the rank of bourgeoisified workers" and this constituted "the real channels for reformism". (5) Such a situation did not exist before the August Revolution of 1945.

Third, modern revisionism began to penetrate into our Party when the Fourth Plenary Session of the Central Committee of the Fifth Congress uncritically approved a report which supported the lines of the 20th Congress of the C.P.S.U., and adopted the line of "achieving socialism peacefully through parliamentary means as the line of the P.K.I. This "peaceful road", one of the characteristics of modern revisionism, was further reaffirmed in the Sixth National Congress of the P.K.I. which approved the following passage in the Party Constitution: "There is a possibility that a people's democratic system as a transitional stage to socialism in Indonesia can be achieved by peaceful means, in parliamentary way. The P.K.I. persistently strives to transform this possibility into a reality." This revisionist line was further emphasized in the Seventh National Congress of the P.K.I. and was never corrected, not even when our Party was already aware that since the 20th Congress of the C.P.S.U., the leadership of the C.P.S.U. had been following the road of modern revisionism.

The self-criticism stresses that the experience of the P.K.I. provides the lesson that by criticizing the modern revisionism of the C.P.S.U. leadership alone, it does not mean that the P.K.I. itself will automatically be free from errors of Right opportunism, the same as what the modern revisionists are doing. The experience of the P.K.I. provides the lesson that modern revisionism, the greatest danger in the international communist movement, is also the greatest danger for the P.K.I. For the P.K.I., modern revisionism is not "a latent but not an acute danger", but a concrete danger that has brought great damage to the Party and serious losses for the revolutionary movement of the Indonesian people. Therefore, we must not in any way underestimate the danger of modern revisionism and must wage a resolute and ruthless struggle against it. The firm stand against modern revisionism in all fields can be effectively maintained only when our Party abandons the line of "preserving friendship with the modern revisionists".

It is a fact that the P.K.I., while criticizing the modern revisionism of the C.P.S.U. leadership, also made revisionist mistakes itself, because it had revised Marxist-Leninist teachings on class struggle, state and revolution. Furthermore, the P.K.I. leadership not only did not wage a struggle in the theoretical field against other "revolutionary" political thoughts which could mislead the proletariat, as Lenin has taught us to do, but had voluntarily given concessions in the theoretical field. The P.K.l. leadership maintained that there was an identity between the three components of Marxism: materialist philosophy, political economy and scientific socialism, and the so-called "three components of Sukarno's teachings" - They wanted to make Marxism, which is the ideology of the working class, the property of the whole nation which includes the exploiting classes hostile to the working class.

The Main Errors in the Political Field

The self-criticism says that the mistakes of Right opportunism in the political field which are now under discussion include three problems: (1) the road to people's democracy in Indonesia, (2) the question of state power, and (3) the implementation of the policy of the national united front.

One of the fundamental differences and problems of disputes between Marxism-Leninism and modern revisionism lies precisely in the problem of choosing the road to socialism. Marxism-Leninism teaches that socialism can only be achieved through the road of proletarian revolution and that in the case of colonial or semi-colonial and semi-feudal countries like Indonesia, socialism can only be achieved by first completing the stage of the people's democratic revolution. On the contrary, revisionism dreams of achieving socialism through the "peaceful road".

During the initial years of this period since 1951, our Party had achieved certain results in the political struggle as well as in the building of the Party. One important achievement of this period was the formulation of the main problems of the Indonesian revolution. It was formulated that the present stage of the Indonesian revolution was a new-type bourgeois democratic revolution, whose tasks were to liquidate imperialism and the vestiges of feudalism and to establish a people's democratic system as a transitional stage to socialism. The driving forces of the revolution were the working class, the peasantry and the petty bourgeoisie: the leading force of the revolution was the working class and the principal mass strength of the revolution was the peasantry. It was also formulated that the national bourgeoisie was a wavering force of the revolution who might side with the revolution to certain limits and at certain periods but who, at other times, might betray the revolution. The Party furthermore formulated that the working class in order to fulfil its obligation as the leader of the revolution, must forge a revolutionary united front with other revolutionary classes and groups based on worker-peasant alliance and under the leadership of the working class.

However, there was a very important shortcoming which in later days developed into Right opportunism or revisionism, namely, that the Party had not yet come to the clearest unity of minds on the principal means and the main form of struggle of the Indonesian revolution.

The Chinese revolution, the self-criticism says, has provided the lesson concerning the main form of struggle of the revolution in colonial or semi-colonial and semi-feudal countries, namely, the people's armed struggle against the armed counter-revolution. In line with the essence of the revolution as an agrarian revolution, then the essence of the people's armed struggle is the armed struggle of the peasants in an agrarian revolution under the leadership of the working class. The practice of the Chinese revolution is first and foremost the application of Marxism-Leninism to the concrete conditions of China. At the same time, it has laid down the general law for the revolutions of the peoples in colonial or semi-colonial and semi-feudal countries.

To achieve its complete victory, it stresses, the Indonesian revolution must also follow the road of the Chinese revolution. This means that the Indonesian revolution must inevitably adopt this main form of struggle, namely, the people's armed struggle against the armed counter-revolution which, in essence, is the armed agrarian revolution of the peasants under the leadership of the proletariat. All forms of legal and parliamentary work should serve the principal means and the main form of struggle, and must not in any way impede the process of the ripening of armed struggle.

The experience during the last fifteen years has taught us that starting from not explicitly denying the "peaceful road" and not firmly holding to the general law of revolution in colonial or semi-colonial and semi-feudal countries, the P.K.I. gradually got bogged down in parliamentary and other forms of legal struggle. The Party leadership even considered this to he the main form of struggle to achieve the strategic aim of the Indonesian revolution. The legality of the Party was not considered as one method of struggle at a given time and under certain conditions, but was rather regarded as a principle, while other forms of struggle should serve this principle. Even when counter-revolution not only has trampled underfoot the legality of the Party, but has violated the basic human rights of the Communists as well, the Party leadership still tried to defend this "legality" with all their might. The "peaceful road" was firmly established in the Party when the Fourth Plenary Session of the Central Committee of the Fifth Congress in 1956 adopted a document which approved the modern revisionist line of the 20th Congress of the C.P.S.U. In such a situation, when the revisionist line was already firmly established in the Party, it was impossible to have a correct Marxist-Leninist line of strategy and tactics. The formulation of the main lines of strategy and tactics of the Party started from a vacillation between the "peaceful road" and the "road of armed revolution", in the process of which the "peaceful road" finally became dominant.

Under such conditions, the General Line of the P.K.I. was formulated by the Sixth National Congress (1959). It reads, "To continue the forging of the national united front, and to continue the building of the Party, so as to accomplish the demands of the August Revolution of 1945." Based on the General Line of the Party, the slogan "Raise the Three Banners of the Party" was decided. These were: (1) the banner of the national united front, (2) the banner of the building of the Party, and (3) the banner of the 1945 August Revolution. The General Line was meant as the road to people's democracy in Indonesia.

The Party leadership tried to explain that the Three Banners of the Party were the three main weapons to win the people's democratic revolution which, as Comrade Mao Tsetung has said, were "a well-disciplined Party armed with the theory of Marxism-Leninism, using the method of self- criticism and linked with the masses of the people; an army under the leadership of such a Party: a united front of all revolutionary classes and all revolutionary groups under the leadership of such a Party" .(6)

Thus the second main weapon means that there must be a people's armed struggle against armed counterrevolution under the leadership of the Party. The Party leadership tried to replace this with the slogan "Raise the banner of the 1945 August Revolution".

In order to prove that the road followed was not the opportunist "peaceful road", the Party leadership always spoke of the two possibilities, the possibility of a "peaceful road" and the possibility of a non-peaceful road. They held that the better the Party prepared itself to face the possibility of a non-peaceful road, the greater would be the possibility of a "peaceful road". By doing so the Party leadership cultivated in the minds of Party members, the working class and the masses of the working people the hope for a peaceful road which in reality did not exist.

In practice, the Party leadership did not prepare the whole ranks of the Party, the working class and the masses of the people to face the possibility of a non-peaceful road. The most striking proof of it was the grave tragedy which happened after the outbreak and the failure of the September 30th Movement. Within a very short space of time, the counter-revolution succeeded in massacring and arresting hundreds of thousands of Communists and non-communist revolutionaries who found themselves in a passive position, paralysing the organization of the P.K.l. and the revolutionary mass organizations. Such a situation surely would never happen if the Party leadership did not deviate from the revolutionary road.

The Party leadership declared, says the self-criticism that "our Party must not copy the theory of armed struggle abroad, but must carry out the Method of Combining the Three Forms of Struggle: guerrilla warfare in the countryside (especially by farm labourers and poor peasants) revolutionary actions by the workers (especially transport workers) in cities, and intensive work among the enemy's armed forces". The Party leadership criticized some comrades who, in studying the experience of the armed struggle of the Chinese people. were considered seeing only its similarities with the conditions in Indonesia. On the contrary, the Party leadership put forward several allegedly different conditions that must be taken into account, until they arrived at the conclusion that the method typical to the Indonesian revolution was the "Method of Combining the Three Forms of Struggle". To fulfil its heavy but great and noble historical mission, to lead the people's revolution against imperialism, feudalism and bureaucrat-capitalism. the Indonesian Marxist-Leninists must firmly reject the revisionist "peaceful road", reject the "theory of the Method of Combining the Three Forms of Struggle" and hold aloft the banner of armed people's revolution. Following the example of the glorious Chinese revolution. the Indonesian Marxist- Leninists must establish revolutionary base areas; they must "turn the backward villages into advanced. consolidated base areas, into great military. political, economic and cultural bastions of the revolution".

While working for the realization of this most principal question we must also carry out other forms of struggle; armed struggle will never advance without being coordinated with other forms of struggle.

* * * * *

The line of Right opportunism followed by the Party leadership was also reflected in their attitude with regard to the state, in particular to the state of the Republic of Indonesia, the self-criticism says.

Based on this Marxist-Leninist teaching on state, the task of the P.K.I., after the August Revolution of 1945 failed, should have been the education of the Indonesian working class and the rest of the working people, so as to make them understand as clearly as possible the class nature of the state of the Republic of Indonesia as a bourgeois dictatorship. The P.K.I. should have aroused the consciousness of the working class and the working people that their struggle for liberation would inevitably lead to the necessity of "superseding the bourgeois state" by the people's state under the leadership of the working class. through a "violent revolution". But the P.K.I. leadership took the opportunist line that gave rise to the illusion among the people about bourgeois democracy.

The self-criticism says that the climax of the deviation from Marxist-Leninist teaching on state committed by the Party leadership was the formulation of the "theory of the two aspects in the state power of the Republic of Indonesia".

The "two-aspect theory" viewed the state and the state power in the following way:

The state power of the Republic, viewed as contradiction. is a contradiction between two opposing aspects. This first aspect is the aspect which represents the interests of the people (manifested by the progressive stands and policies of President Sukarno that are supported by the P.K.I. and other groups of the people). The second aspect is the aspect that represents the enemies of the people (manifested by the stands and policies of the Right- wing forces and die-hards). The people's aspect has now become the main aspect and takes the leading role in the state power of the Republic

The "two-aspect theory" obviously is an opportunist or revisionist deviation, because it denies the Marxist-Leninist teaching that "the state is an organ of the rule of a definite class which cannot be reconciled with its antipode (the class opposite to it)".(7) It is unthinkable that the Republic of Indonesia can be jointly ruled by the people and the enemies of the people.

The self-criticism says that the Party leadership who wallowed in the mire of opportunism claimed that the "people's aspect" had become the main aspect and taken the hegemony in the state power of the Republic. It was as if the Indonesian people were nearing the birth of a people's power. And since they considered that the forces of the national bourgeoisie in the state power really constituted the "people's aspect", the Party leadership had done everything to defend and develop this "people's aspect". The Party leadership had altogether merged themselves in the interests of the national bourgeoisie. By considering the national bourgeoisie the "people's aspect" in the state power of the Republic, and President Sukarno the leader of this aspect, the Party leadership erroneously recognized that the national bourgeoisie was able to lead the new-type democratic revolution. This is contrary to historical necessity and historical facts. The Party leadership declared that the "two-aspect theory" was completely different from the "theory of structural reform" (8) of the leadership of the revisionist Italian Communist Party. However, the fact is, theoretically or on the basis of practical realities, there is no difference between the two "theories". Both have for their starting point the "peaceful road" to socialism. Both dream of a gradual change in the internal balance of forces in the state power. Both reject the road of revolution and both are revisionist.

The anti-revolutionary "two-aspect theory" glaringly exposed itself in the statement that "the struggle of the P.K.I. with regard to the state power is to promote the pro-people aspect so as to make it bigger and dominant, and the anti- people force can be driven out from the state power".

The Party leadership even had a name for this anti- revolutionary road; they called it the road of "revolution from above and below". By "revolution from above" they meant that the P.K.I. "must encourage the state power to take revolutionary steps aimed at making the desired changes in the personnel and in the state organs". While by "revolution from below" they meant that the P.K.I. "must arouse, organize and mobilize the people to achieve the same changes". It is indeed an extraordinary phantasy! The Party leadership did not learn from the fact that the concept of President Sukarno on the formation of a co-operation cabinet (the old-type government of national coalition), eight years after its announcement, had not been realized as yet. There was even no sign that it would ever be realized, despite the insistent demands. Let alone a change in the state power!

The self-criticism stresses that to clean itself from the mire of opportunism, our Party must discard this "theory of two-aspect in the state power" and re-establish the Marxist- Leninist teaching on state and revolution.

* * * * *

The 5th National Congress of the Party in the main had solved theoretically the problem of the national united front. It formulated that the worker-peasant alliance was the basis of the national united front. With regard to the national bourgeoisie a lesson had been drawn on the basis of the experience during the August Revolution that this class had a wavering character. In a certain situation, the national bourgeoisie took part in the revolution and sided with the revolution, while in another situation they followed in the steps of the comprador-bourgeoisie to attack the driving forces of the revolution and betrayed the revolution (as shown by their activities during the Madiun Provocation and their approval of the Round Table Conference Agreement). Based on this wavering character of the national bourgeoisie, the Party formulated the stand that must be taken by the P.K.I., namely, to make continuous efforts to win the national bourgeoisie over to the side of revolution, while guarding against the possibility of its betraying the revolution. The P.K.I. must follow the policy of unity and struggle towards the national bourgeoisie, the self-criticism says.

Nevertheless, since the ideological weakness of subjectivism in the Party, particularly among the Party leadership, had not yet been eradicated, the Party was dragged into more and more serious mistakes, to such an extent that the Party lost its independence in the united front with the national bourgeoisie. This mistake had led to the situation in which the Party and the proletariat were placed as the appendage of the national bourgeoisie.

The self-criticism states that a manifestation of this loss of independence in the united front with the national bourgeoisie was the evaluation and the stand of the Party leadership towards Sukarno. The Party leadership did not adopt an independent attitude towards Sukarno. They had always avoided conflicts with Sukarno and, on the contrary, had greatly over-emphasized the similarities and the unity between the Party and Sukarno. The public saw that there was no policy of Sukarno that was not supported by the P.K.I. The Party leadership went so far as to accept without any struggle the recognition to Sukarno as "the great leader of the revolution" and the leader of the "people's aspect" in the state power of the Republic. In many articles and speeches, the Party leaders frequently said that the struggle of the P.K.I. was based not only on Marxism-Leninism, but also on "the teachings of Sukarno", that the P.K.I. made such a rapid progress because it realized Sukarno's idea of Nasakom unity,(9) etc. Even the concept of the people's democratic system in Indonesia was said to be in conformity with Sukarno's main ideas as expressed in his speech "The Birth of Pantjasila"(10) on June 1,1945.

The self-criticism repudiates the erroneous view that "to implement the Political Manifesto in a consistent manner is the same as implementing the programme of the P.K.I."

The statement that consistently implementing the Political Manifesto meant implementing the programme of the P.K.I. could only be interpreted that it was not the programme of the P.K.I. that was accepted by the bourgeoisie, but that, on the contrary, it was the programme of the national bourgeoisie which was accepted by the P.K.I., and was made to replace the programme of the P.K.I., it points out.

The self-criticism says that the abandonment of principle in the united front with the national bourgeoisie had developed even further in the so-called "General Line of the Indonesian Revolution" that was formulated as follows: "With the national united front having the workers and peasants as its pillars, the Nasakom as the core and the Pantjasila as its ideological basis, to complete the national democratic revolution in order to advance towards Indonesian Socialism." This so-called "General Line of the Indonesian Revolution" had not even the faintest smell of the revolution. Because, from the three preconditions to win the revolution, namely, a strong Marxist-Leninist Party, a people's armed struggle under the leadership of the Party, and a united front, only the united front was retained. Even then, it was not a revolutionary united front, because it was not led by the working class, nor was it based on the alliance of the working class and the peasantry under the leadership of the working class, but on the contrary it was based on the Nasakom.

The Party leadership said that "the slogan for national co-operation with the Nasakom as the core will by no means obscure the class content of the national united front". This statement is incorrect. The class content of the Nasakom was the working class, the national bourgeoisie, and even elements of the compradors, the bureaucrat-capitalists and the landlords. Obviously, putting the Nasakom in the core not only meant obscuring the class content of the national united front, but radically changing the meaning of the revolutionary national united front into an alliance of the working class with all other classes in the country, including the reactionary classes, into class collaboration. This error must be corrected. The Party must throw to the dust-bin the erroneous "General Line of the Indonesian Revolution" and return to the correct conception of a revolutionary national united front based on the alliance of the workers and peasants under the leadership of the working class. The abandonment of principle in the united front with the national bourgeoisie was also the result of the Party's in- ability to make a correct and concrete analysis of the concrete situation, the self-criticism says.

The self-criticism points out that ever since the failure of the August Revolution of 1945, except in West Irian, the imperialists did not hold direct political power in Indonesia. In Indonesia, political power was in the hands of compradors and landlords who represented the interests of imperialism and the vestiges of feudalism. Besides, there was no imperialist aggression in Indonesia taking place. Under such a situation, provided that the P.K.I. did not make political mistakes, the contradiction between the ruling reactionary classes and the people would develop and sharpen, constituting the main contradiction in Indonesia. The primary task of the Indonesian revolution is the overthrow of the rule of the reactionary classes within the country who also represent the interests of the imperialists, in particular the United States imperialists. Only by taking this road can the real liquidation of imperialism and the vestiges of feudalism be realized.

By correcting the mistakes made by the Party in the united front with the national bourgeoisie it does not mean that now the Party need not unite with this class. On the basis of the worker-peasant alliance under the leadership of the working class, our Party must work to win the national bourgeois class over to the side of the revolution.

The Main Mistakes in the organizational Field

The self-criticism says that the erroneous political line which dominated the Party was inevitably followed by an equally erroneous organizational line. The longer and the more intensive the wrong political line ruled in the Party, the greater were the mistakes in the organizational field, and the greater the losses caused by them. Right opportunism which constituted the wrong political line of the Party in the period after 1951 had been followed by another Right deviation in the organizational field, namely, liberalism and legalism.

The line of liberalism in the organizational field manifested itself in the tendency to make the P.K.I. a Party with as large a membership as possible, a Party with a loose organization, which was called a mass Party.

It says that the mass character of the Party is not deter- mined above all by the large membership, but primarily by the close ties linking the Party and the masses, by the Party's political line which defends the interests of the masses, or in other words by the implementation of the Party's mass line. And the mass line of the Party can only be maintained when the prerequisites determining the Party's role as the advanced detachment are firmly upheld, when the Party members are made up of the best elements of the proletariat who are armed with Marxism-Leninism. Consequently, to build a Marxist-Leninist Party which has a mass character is impossible without giving primary importance to Marxist- Leninist education.

The self-criticism points out that during the last few years, the P.K.I. had carried out a line of Party building which deviated from the principles of Marxism-Leninism in the organizational field.

The self-criticism says that this liberal expansion of Party membership could not be separated from the political line of the "peaceful road". The large membership was intended to increase the influence of the Party in the united front with the national bourgeoisie. The idea was to effect the gradual change in the balance of forces that would make it possible to completely defeat the die-hard forces, with a Party that was growing bigger and bigger, in addition to the continued policy of unity with the national bourgeoisie.

The stress was no longer laid on the education and the training of Marxist-Leninist cadres to prepare them for the revolution, for work among the peasants in order to establish revolutionary bases, but on the education of intellectuals to serve the needs of the work in the united front with the national bourgeoisie, and to supply cadres for the various positions in the state institutions that were obtained thanks to the co-operation with the national bourgeoisie. The slogan of "total integration with the peasants" had become empty talk. What was being done in practice was to draw cadres from the countryside to the cities, from the regions to the centre, instead of sending the best cadres to work in the rural areas.

To raise the prestige of the P.K.I. in the eyes of the bourgeoisie, and to make it respected as the Party of intellectuals, the 4-Year Plan stipulated that all cadres of the higher ranks must obtain academic education, cadres of the middle ranks high school education, and cadres of the lower ranks lower middle school education. For this purpose the Party had set up a great number of academies, schools and courses. So deep-rooted was the intellectualism gripping the Party leadership that all Party leaders and prominent figures of the popular movements were obliged to write four theses in order to obtain the degree of "Marxist Scientists".

The deeper the Party was plunged into the mire of opportunism and revisionism, the greater it lacked organizational vigilance and the more extensively legalism developed in the organization. The Party leadership had lost its class prejudice towards the falsehood of bourgeois democracy. All the activities of the Party indicated as if the "peaceful road' was an inevitable certainty. The Party leadership did not arouse the vigilance of the masses of Party members to the danger of the attacks by the reactionaries who were constantly on the look for the chance to strike. Due to this legalism in the organizational field, within a short span of time counter-revolution has succeeded in paralysing the P.K.I. organizationally.

Liberalism in organization had destroyed the principle of internal democracy in the Party, destroyed collective leadership and had given rise to personal leadership and personal rule, to autonomism. In a situation when liberalism dominated the organizational line of the Party, it was impossible to realize the Party's style of work "to combine theory and practice, to keep close bonds with the masses and to conduct self- criticism". It was equally impossible to realize the method of leadership whose essence is the unity of the leadership and the masses; to realize it the leadership must give an example to the rank-and-file.

The self-criticism points out that thus, in general the wrong political line which ruled in the Party was followed by the wrong line in the organizational field which violated the principles of a Marxist-Leninist Party, destroyed the organizational foundation of the Party, namely, democratic centralism, and trampled on the Party's style of work and method of leadership.

The self-criticism emphatically points out that to build the P.K.I. as a Marxist-Leninist Party, we must thoroughly uproot liberalism in the organizational field and its ideological source. The P.K.I. must be rebuilt as a Lenin-type Party, a Party that will be capable of fulfilling its role as the advanced detachment and the highest form of class organization of the Indonesian proletariat, a Party with a historical mission of leading the masses of the Indonesian people to win victory in the anti-imperialist, anti-feudal and anti- bureaucrat-capitalist revolution, and to advance towards socialism. Such a Party must fulfil the following conditions: Ideologically, it is armed with the theory of Marxism- Leninism, and free from subjectivism, opportunism and modern revisionism; politically, it has a correct programme which includes a revolutionary agrarian programme, has a thorough understanding of the problems of the strategy and tactics of the Indonesian revolution, masters the main form of struggle, namely, the armed struggle of the peasants under the leadership of the proletariat, as well as other forms of struggle, is capable of establishing a revolution-nary united front of all anti-imperialist and anti-feudal classes based on the worker-peasant alliance under the leadership of the working class; organizationally, it is strong and has a deep root among the masses of the people, consists of trustworthy, experienced and steeled Party members who are models in the implementation of the national tasks.

Today, we are rebuilding our Party under the reign of counter-revolutionary white terror which is most cruel and ferocious. The legality of the Party and the basic human rights of the Communists have been wantonly violated. The Party, therefore, has to be organized and has to work in complete illegality. While working in complete illegality, the Party must be adept at utilizing to the full all possible opportunities to carry out legal activities according to circumstances, and to choose ways and means that are acceptable to the masses with the aim of mobilizing the masses for struggle and leading this struggle step by step to a higher stage.

The self-criticism stresses that in rebuilding the P.K.I. along the Marxist-Leninist line, the greatest attention should be devoted to the building of Party organizations in the rural areas, to the establishment of revolutionary bases.

The task to rebuild a Marxist-Leninist Party as has been stated above requires arduous and protracted work, and is full of danger, and consequently it must be carried out courageously, perseveringly, carefully, patiently and persistently.

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